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Abstract
Peer-prediction [18] is a (meta-)mechanism which, given any proper scoring rule, produces a
mechanism to elicit privately-held, non-verifiable information from self-interested agents. For-
mally, truth-telling is a strict Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. Unfortunately, there may be
other equilibria as well (including uninformative equilibria where all players simply report the
same fixed signal, regardless of their true signal) and, typically, the truth-telling equilibrium
does not have the highest expected payoff. The main result of this paper is to show that, in the
symmetric binary setting, by tweaking peer-prediction, in part by carefully selecting the proper
scoring rule it is based on, we can make the truth-telling equilibrium focal—that is, truth-telling
has higher expected payoff than any other equilibrium.
Along the way, we prove the following: in the setting where agents receive binary signals we
1) classify all equilibria of the peer-prediction mechanism; 2) introduce a new technical tool for
understanding scoring rules, which allows us to make truth-telling pay better than any other
informative equilibrium; 3) leverage this tool to provide an optimal version of the previous result;
that is, we optimize the gap between the expected payoff of truth-telling and other informative
equilibria; and 4) show that with a slight modification to the peer-prediction framework, we
can, in general, make the truth-telling equilibrium focal—that is, truth-telling pays more than
any other equilibrium (including the uninformative equilibria).
1 Introduction
From Facebook.com’s “What’s on your mind?” to Netflix’s 5-point ratings, from innumerable sur-
vey requests in one’s email inbox to Ebay’s reputation system, user feedback plays an increasingly
central role in our online lives. This feedback can serve a variety of important purposes, includ-
ing supporting product recommendations, scholarly research, product development, pricing, and
purchasing decisions. With increasing requests for information, agents must decide where to turn
their attention. When privately held information is elicited, sometimes agents may be intrinsically
motivated to both participate and report the truth. Other times, self-interested agents may need
incentives to compensate for costs associated with truth-telling and reporting: the effort required
to complete the rating (which could lead to a lack of reviews), the effort required to produce an
accurate rating (which might lead to inaccurate reviews), foregoing the opportunity to submit an in-
accurate review that could benefit the agent in future interactions [12] (which could, e.g., encourage
negative reviews), or a potential loss of privacy [8] (which could encourage either non-participation
or incorrect reviews).
To overcome a lack of (representative) reviews, a system could reward users for reviews. How-
ever, this can create perverse incentives that lead to inaccurate reviews. If agents are merely
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rewarded for participation, they may not take time to answer the questions carefully, or even
meaningfully.
To this end, explicit reward systems for honest ratings have been developed. If the ratings
correspond to objective information that will be revealed at a future date, this information can
be leveraged (e.g., via prediction markets) to incentive honesty. In this paper, we study situations
where this is not the case: the ratings cannot be independently verified either because no objective
truth exists (the ratings are inherently subjective) or an objective truth exists, but is not observable.
In such cases, it is known that correlation between user types can be leveraged to elicit truthful
reports by using side payments [5, 4, 1, 2]. Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser [18] propose a particular
such (meta-)mechanism for truthful feedback elicitation, known as peer prediction. Given any
proper scoring rule (a simple class of payment functions we describe further below), and a prior
where each agent’s signal is “stochastically relevant” (informative about other agents’ signals), the
corresponding peer prediction mechanism has truth-telling as a strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
There is a major problem, however: alternative, non-truthful equilibria may have higher payoff
for the agents than truth-telling. This is the challenge that our work addresses.
Our Results The main result of this paper is to show that by tweaking peer prediction, in part by
specially selecting the proper scoring rule it is based on, we can make the truth-telling equilibrium
focal–that is, truth-telling has higher expected payoff than any other equilibrium.
Along the way we prove the following: in the setting where agents receive binary signals we 1)
classify all equilibria of the peer prediction mechanism; 2) introduce a new technical tool, the best
response plot, and use it to show that we can find proper scoring rules so the truth-telling pays
more, in expectation, than any other informative equilibrium; 3) we provide an optimal version of
the previous result, that is we optimize the gap between the expected payoff of truth-telling and
other informative equilibrium; and 4) we show that with a slight modification to the peer prediction
framework, we can, in general, make the truth-telling equilibrium focal—that is, truth-telling pays
more than any other equilibrium (including the uninformative equilibria).
The main technical tool we use is a best response plot, which allows us to easily reason about
the payoffs of different equilibria. We first prove that no asymmetric equilibria exist. The naive
approach then would be to simply plot the payoffs of different symmetric strategies. However, for
even the simplest proper-scoring rules, these payoff curves are paraboloid, and hence difficult to
analyze directly. The best response plot differs from this naive approach in two ways: first, instead
of plotting the strategies of agents explicitly, the best response plot aggregates the results of these
actions; second, instead of plotting the payoffs of all agents, the best response plot analyzes the
payoff of one distinguished agent which, given the strategies of the remaining agents, plays her best
response. This makes the plot piece-wise linear for all proper scoring rules, which makes analysis
tractable. We hope that the best response plot will be useful in future work using proper scoring
rules.
1.1 Related Work
Since the seminal work of Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser introducing peer prediction [18], a host
of results in closely related models have followed (see, e.g., [13, 15, 12, 10]), primarily motivated
by opinion elicitation in online settings where there is no objective ground truth.
Recent research [7] indicates that individuals in lab experiments do not always truth-tell when
faced with peer prediction mechanisms; this may in part be related to the issue of equilibrium
multiplicity. Gao et al. [7] ran studies over Mechanical Turk using two treatments: in the first
they compensated the participants according to peer prediction payments, and in the second they
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gave them a flat reward for participation. In their work, the mechanism had complete knowledge
of the prior. The participants responded truthfully more often when the payoffs were fixed than
in response to the peer prediction payments. However, it should be noted that the task the agents
were asked to perform took little effort (report the received signal), and the participants were not
primed with any information about the truthful equilibrium of the peer prediction mechanism (they
were only told the payoffs)–an actual surveyor would have incentive to prime the participants to
report truthfully.
The most closely related work is a series of papers by Jurca and Faltings [13, 15], which studies
collusion between the reporting agents. In a weak model of collusion, the agents may be able
to coordinate ahead of time (before receiving their signals) to select the equilibrium with the
highest payoff. Jurca and Faltings use techniques from algorithmic mechanism design to design a
mechanism where, in most situations, the only symmetric pure Nash equilibria are truth-telling.
They explicitly state the challenge of analysing mixed-Nash equilibrium as an open question, and
show challenges to doing this in their algorithmic mechanism design framework [13, 15]. Our
techniques, in contrast, allow us to analyse all Nash equilibria of the peer prediction mechanism
including both mixed-strategy and asymmetric equilibria. Instead of eliminating equilibria, we
enforce that they have a lower expected payoff than truth-telling. Additionally, the algorithmic
mechanism design framework used by Jurca and Faltings sacrifices “the simplicity of specifying the
payments through closed-form scoring rules” [13] that was present in the peer prediction paper.
Our work recovers a good deal of that simplicity.
Jurca and Faltings further analyze other settings where colluding agents can make transfer
payments, or may collude after receiving their signals. In particular, they again use automated
mechanism design to show that in the case where agents coordinate after receiving their signals
that even without transfer payments, there will always be multiple equilibria; in this setting, they
pose the question of whether the truth-telling equilibrium can be endowed with the highest expected
payoff. We do not deal with this setting explicitly, but in the settings we consider, we show that
even in the face of multiple equilibria, we can ensure that the truth-telling equilibrium has the
highest expected payoff and no other equilibrium is paid the same with truth-telling.
In a different paper [12], Jurca and Faltings show how to minimize payments in the peer pre-
diction framework. Their goal is to discover how much “cost” is associated with a certain marginal
improvement of truth-telling over lying. In this paper, they also consider generalizations of peer
prediction, where more than one other agent’s report is used as a reference. Our work takes this
to the extreme (as did [8] before us) using all of the other agents’ reports as references.
A key motivation of one branch of the related work is removing the assumption that the mech-
anism knows the common prior [19, 17, 3, 16, 20, 6, 23, 22, 14, 11, 21]. Dasgupta and Ghosh
[3], Kamble et al. [16] have a different setting than us. In their setting, agents are asked to answer
several a priori similar questions while our mechanism applies to one question (thus we do not
need to assume the relation between questions). Kamble et al. [16]’s mechanism applies to both
homogeneous and heterogeneous population but requires a large number of a priori similar tasks.
However, Kamble et al. [16]’s mechanism contains non-truthful equilibria that are paid higher than
truth-telling. Dasgupta and Ghosh [3]’s mechanism has truth-telling as the equilibrium with the
highest payoff, but contains a non-truthful equilibrium that is paid as much as truth-telling. Prelec
[19] shows that in his Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS), truth-telling maximizes each individual’s ex-
pected “Information-score” across all equilibria. However, this guarantee is not strict, and requires
the number of agents to be infinite, even to just have truth-telling be an equilibrium. Moreover, it is
hard to classify the equilibria or optimize mechanism in Prelec’s setting. Another drawback of BTS
is that it requires agents to report prediction while our mechanism only requires agents to report a
single signal. Radanovic and Faltings [20]’s mechanism solves this drawback but that mechanism
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is in a sensing scenario and needs to compare the information of an sensor’s local neighbours with
the information of global sensors while our mechanism does not require this local/global structure.
Moreover, like BTS, Radanovic and Faltings [20]’s mechanism does not have strictness guarantee
and requires the number of agents to be infinite even to have truth-telling as an equilibrium. In
addition, Lambert and Shoham [17] provide a mechanism such that no equilibrium pays more than
truth-telling, but here all equilibria pay the same amount; and while truth-telling is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, unlike in peer prediction it generally is not a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Minimal Truth Serum (MTS) [21] is a mechanism where agents have the option to report or not
report their predictions, and also lacks analysis of non-truthful equilibria. MTS uses a typical
zero-sum technique such that all equilibria are paid equally.
Equilibrium multiplicity is clearly a pervasive problem in this literature. While our present work
only applies to the classical peer prediction mechanism, it provides an important step in addressing
equilibrium multiplicity, and a new toolkit for reasoning about proper scoring rules.
2 Preliminaries, Background, and Notation
2.1 Game Setting
Consider a setting with n agents A. If A′ ⊆ A, we let −A′ denote A\A′. Each agent i has a private
signal σi ∈ Σ. We consider a game in which each agent i reports some signal σˆi ∈ Σ. Let σ denote
the vector of signals and σˆ denote the vector of reports. Let σ−i and σˆ−i denote the signals and
reports excluding that of agent i; we regularly use the −i notation to exclude an agent i.
We would like to encourage truth-telling, namely that agent i reports σˆi = σi. To this end,
agent i will receive some payment νi(σˆi, σˆ−i) from our mechanism. In this paper, the game will
be anonymous, in that each player’s payoffs will depend only on the player’s own report and the
fraction of other players giving each possible report ∈ Σ, and not on the identities of those players.
Assumption 2.1 (Binary Signals). We will refer to the case when Σ = {0, 1} as the binary signal
setting, and we focus on this setting in this paper.
Assumption 2.2 (Symmetric Prior). We assume throughout that the agents’ signals σ are drawn
from some joint symmetric prior Q: a priori, each agent’s signal is drawn from the same distri-
bution. We in fact only leverage a weaker assumption, that ∀σ, σ′, and ∀i 6= j and k 6= l, we have
Pr[σj = σ
′|σi = σ] = Pr[σl = σ′|σk = σ].
That is, the inference your signal lets you draw about others’ signals does not depend on your
identity or on the identity of the other agent.
Given the prior Q, for σ ∈ Σ, let q(σ) be the fraction of agents that an agent expects will have
σj = σ a priori. Let
q(σ′|σ) := Pr[σj = σ′|σi = σ]
(where j 6= i) be the fraction of other agents that a user i expects have received signal σ′ given
that he has signal σ.
Assumption 2.3 (Signals Positively Correlated). We assume throughout that the prior Q is pos-
itively correlated, namely that q(σ|σ) > q(σ), for all σ ∈ Σ.
That is, once a player sees that his signal is σ, this strictly increases his belief that others will
have signal σ, when compared with his prior. Notice that even after an agent receives his signal,
he may still believe that he is in the minority. Thus, simply encouraging agent agreement is not
sufficient to incentivize truthful reporting.
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Assumption 2.4 (Signal Asymmetric Prior). An additional assumption we will often use is that
the prior is signal asymmetric. For binary signals, as we consider in this paper, this simply
means that q(0) 6= q(1).
For a richer signal space, intuitively, a signal asymmetric prior is one that changes under a
relabeling of the signals, so that lying can potentially be distinguishable from truth-telling.
We say that an agent plays response σ → σˆ, if the agent reports signal σˆ when he receives signal
σ. Let X be the set of all responses (e.g. X = {0→ 0, 0→ 1, 1→ 0, 1→ 1} when Σ = {0, 1}). In
a pure-strategy an agent chooses a response for each σ ∈ Σ, and thus there are |Σ||Σ| possible pure
strategies. Let S be the set of pure strategies and let si ∈ S denote a pure-strategy for agent i. We
will also consider mixed strategies θi, where agent i randomizes over pure strategies. Here we write
θi(σ
′|σ) := Pr[σˆi = σ′|σi = σ].
A strategy profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) consists of a strategy for each agent.
We can think of each θ as a linear transformation from a distribution over received signals to a
distribution of reported signals. Given a set of agents A′ ⊂ A, we define
θ′A(σ
′|σ) := Ei←A[θi(σ′|σ)]
where i← A′ means i is chosen uniformly at random from A′. When discussing symmetric strategy
profiles where all players use the same strategy, we will often abuse notation and use notation for
one agent’s strategy to denote the entire strategy profile.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) such that no player
wishes to change his strategy, given the strategies of the other players and the information contained
the prior and his signal: for all i and for all alternative strategies θ′i for i, E[νi(θ)] ≥ E[νi(θ′i,θ−i)],
where the expectations are over the realizations of the randomized strategies and the prior Q. We
call such an equilibrium focal if it provides a strictly larger payoff, in expectation, to each agent,
than any other equilibrium and weakly focal if it provides a larger payoff (maybe not strictly).
Given a symmetric prior Q and strategy profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), we define
qˆj(σ
′|σ) := Pr[σˆj = σ′|σi = σ] =
∑
σ′′∈Σ
q(σ′′|σ)θj(σ′|σ′′)
for i 6= j. Intuitively, qˆj(σ′|σ) is the probability of player j reporting σ′, given that another player
i sees signal σ; note that this probability does not depend on the identity of i, by symmetry of the
prior. Given a set of agents A′ ⊂ A, we define
qˆ′A(σ
′|σ) := Ej←A′ qˆj(σ′|σ)
where j ← A′ means j is chosen uniformly at random from A′ (again assuming that the implicit
reference agent i 6∈ A′). If θ = (θ, . . . , θ) is symmetric, we simplify our notation to qˆ(σ′|σ) because
the referenced set of agents does not matter.
In the binary signal setting when θ is symmetric, we have:
qˆ(1|0) = θ(1|0)q(0|0) + θ(1|1)q(1|0) (1)
qˆ(1|1) = θ(1|0)q(0|1) + θ(1|1)q(1|1) (2)
Additionally, we observe that q(1|b) = 1−q(0|b), θi(1|b) = 1−θi(0|b) ∀i, and qˆ(1|b) = 1− qˆ(0|b).
Note that we will typically use b instead of σ to refer to binary signals (bits).
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There are four pure strategies for playing the game in the binary signal setting: always 0, always
1, truth-telling, lying:
S =
{(
0→ 0
1→ 0
)
,
(
0→ 1
1→ 1
)
,
(
0→ 0
1→ 1
)
,
(
0→ 1
1→ 0
)}
= {0,1,T,F}.
We will denote mixed strategies as
(
0→ θ(1|0)
1→ θ(1|1)
)
.
2.2 Proper Scoring Rules
A scoring rule PS : Σ × ∆Σ → R takes in signal σ ∈ Σ and a distribution over signals δΣ ∈ ∆Σ
and outputs a real number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever the first input is drawn from a
distribution δΣ, then the expectation of PS is maximized by δΣ. A scoring rule is called strictly
proper if this maximum is unique. We will assume throughout that the scoring rules we use are
strictly proper. By slightly abusing notation, we can extend a scoring rule to be PS : ∆Σ×∆Σ → R
by simply taking PS(δΣ, δ
′
Σ) = Eσ←δΣ(σ, δ′Σ).
In the case of scoring rules over binary signals, a distribution can be represented by a number
in the unit interval, denoting the probability placed on the signal 1. In the binary signal setting,
then, we extend proper scoring rules to be defined on [0, 1]× [0, 1].
2.3 Peer Prediction
Peer Prediction [18] with n agents receiving positively correlated binary signals b, with symmetric
prior Q, consists of the following mechanism M(bˆ):
1. Each agent i reports a signal bˆi.
2. Each agent i is uniformly randomly matched with an individual j 6= i, and is then paid
PS(bˆj , q(1|bˆi)), where PS is a proper scoring rule.
That is, agent i is paid according to a proper scoring rule, based on i’s prediction that bˆj = 1, where
i’s prediction is computed as either q(1|0) or q(1|1), depending on i’s report to the mechanism. This
can be thought of as having agent i bet on what agent j’s reported signal will be.
Notice that if agent j is truth-telling, then the Bayesian agent i would also be incentivized
to truth-tell (strictly incentivized, if the proper scoring rule is strict). Agent i’s expected payoff
(according to his own posterior distribution) for reporting his true type bi has a premium compared
to reporting ¬bi of:
PS
(
bˆj , q (1|bi)
)
− PS
(
bˆj , q (1|¬bi)
)
≥ 0
(strictly, for strict proper scoring rules) because we know that the expectation of PS(bˆj , ·) is
(uniquely) maximized at q(1|bi).
Here we introduce a convenient way to represent peer prediction mechanism:
Definition 2.5 (Payoff Function Matrix). Each agent i who reports bˆi and is paired with agent j
who reports bˆj, will be paid hbˆj ,bˆi. Then the peer prediction mechanism can be naturally represented
as a 2× 2 matrix: (
h1,1 h1,0
h0,1 h0,0
)
=
(
PS(1, q(1|1)) PS(1, q(1|0))
PS(0, q(1|1)) PS(0, q(1|0))
)
which we call the payoff function matrix.
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Example 2.6 (Example of Proper Scoring Rule). The Brier Scoring Rule for predicting a binary
event is defined as follows. Let I be the indicator random variable for the binary event to be
predicted. Let q be the predicted probability of the event occurring. Then:
B(I, q) = 2I · q + 2(1− I) · (1− q)− q2 − (1− q)2.
Note that if the event occurs with probability p, then the expected payoff of reporting a guess q is
(abusing notation slightly):
B(p, q) = 2p · q + 2(1− p) · (1− q)− q2 − (1− q)2 = 1− 2(p− 2p · q + q2)
This is (uniquely) maximized when p = q, and so the Brier scoring rule is a strictly proper scoring
rule. Note also that B(p, q) is a linear function in p. Hence, if p is drawn from a distribution, we
have: Ep[B(p, q)] = B(E[p], q), and so this is also maximized by reporting q = E[p].
A slight generalization of the Brier Scoring Rule is the “Shifted Brier Scoring rule”, which also
takes a parameter c ∈ R. We write Bc(p, q) = B(p−c, q−c), so that both of the inputs are “shifted”
before the scoring rule is evaluated. The Shifted Brier Scoring rule is also a strictly proper scoring
rule.
Example 2.7. Say that a restaurant with quality parameter p satisfies each customer with proba-
bility p and fails to satisfy them with probability 1−p. Consider a restaurant with quality parameter
p uniformly distributed between 2/5 and 4/5.
In this case, we have that q(1) = 35 , q(1|1) = 2845 , and q(1|0) = 1730 .
If we use Peer Prediction based on Brier scoring rule (see example A.1), we get the following
payoff function matrix (
0.715 0.624
0.226 0.358
)
=
(
B(1, q(1|1)) B(1, q(1|0))
B(0, q(1|1)) B(0, q(1|0))
)
This means, for example, if an agent reports 1 and is paired with an agent that reports 0, he will
receive payoff 0.226.
Thus if all the other agents play truthfully, the expected payoff of the agent who receives a
1 and plays truthfully will be B(q(1|1), q(1|1)) = q(1|1) ∗ B(1, q(1|1)) + q(0|1) ∗ B(0, q(1|1)) =
q(1|1) ∗ 0.715 + q(0|1) ∗ 0.226 since with probability q(1|1), he believes the agent paired with him
recevies and reports 1 which implies he will be paid 0.715, with probability q(0|1), he believes the
agent paired with him recevies and reports 0 which implies he will be paid 0.226. Similarly,
B(q(1|1), q(1|1)) = B
(
28
45
,
28
45
)
≈ .530 if he receives a 1 and plays truthfully;
B(q(1|1), q(1|0)) = B
(
28
45
,
17
30
)
≈ .524 if he receives a 1 and lies;
B(q(1|0), q(1|0)) = B
(
17
30
,
17
30
)
≈ .509 if he receives a 0 and plays truthfully; and
B(q(1|0), q(1|1)) = B
(
17
30
,
28
45
)
≈ .503 if he receives a 0 and lies.
No matter which signal he receives, the agent will be better off truth-telling than lying, given that
all other agents truth-tell. So truth-telling is an equilibrium in this example.
Notice that if all agents played 0 or all played 1, this would also be a Nash equilibrium. Also
note, the payoff for each agent in either of these equilibria is 1.
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While truth-telling is always an equilibrium of the peer prediction mechanism, as we will see,
it is not the only equilibrium. Two more equilibria are to always play 0 or always play 1. In
Section 4, we further investigate equilibria of the peer prediction game. Based our the analysis
of these multiple equilibria, we will develop a modified peer prediction mechanism, wherein
players are paid according to the peer prediction based on a carefully-designed proper scoring rule,
modulo some punishment imposed on the all playing 0 or all playing 1 strategy profiles. This
modified mechanism will make the truth-telling equilibrium focal.
2.4 Properties of Proper Scoring Rules
Definition 2.8. For a prior Q, proper scoring rule PS, and a binary signal space, we define q∗(b)
to be the fraction of other agents reporting b that would make an agent indifferent between reporting
0 or 1, i.e.,
q∗(b) := {p | PS(p, q(b|1)) = PS(p, q(b|0)), 0 ≤ p ≤ 1}.
Since in much of what follows, we will only use q∗(1) and not q∗(0), for convenience, we often
denote q∗(1) by q∗.
Note that q∗(0) + q∗(1) = 1.
We now study existence and uniqueness of q∗(b).
Claim 2.9. For any symmetric prior Q on binary signals, and any proper scoring rule PS, q∗(b)
always exists and lies between q(b|0) and q(b|1); if PS is strict and the signals are positively corre-
lated, q∗(b) is unique and lies strictly between q(b|0) and q(b|1).
Proof. For proper scoring rules over binary signals (where a probability distribution can be rep-
resented by a number in the unit interval), we know that PS(·, `) is an affine function of its first
argument . Therefore `ba(·) = PS(·, q(b|a)) are affine functions for a, b ∈ {0, 1}. We also know, since
PS is a scoring rule, that for a, b ∈ {0, 1}: `ba(q(b|a)) ≥ `b¬a(q(b|a)) (if PS is strict and the signals
are positively correlated, this inequality is strict, since then q(b|a) 6= q(b|¬a), and q(b|a) is a strict
maximizer of PS(q(b|a), ·)). Thus, there is some point q∗(b) between q(b|0) and q(b|1) where the
functions intersect; if PS is strict and signals are positively correlated, this point is unique.
The value q∗(1) will have useful implications for best responses.
Claim 2.10. Given symmetric prior Q and fixing a proper scoring rule, suppose a strategy profile
(θ1, ..., θn) is an equilibrium of the corresponding peer prediction mechanism. Then
if
1
n− 1
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
qˆk(1|b) < q∗(1), then θi(1|b) = 0, and
if
1
n− 1
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
qˆk(1|b) > q∗(1), then θi(1|b) = 1.
For θ symmetric, 1n−1
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
qˆk(1|b) = qˆ(1|b).
Proof. Since any proper scoring rule is affine in the first parameter, we can write PS(p, q) =
f(q) · p + g(q). It follows that the expected payoff for player i when reporting private bit bˆi is
1
n−1
∑
k 6=i
PS(qˆk(1|bˆi), q(1|bˆi)) = PS( 1n−1
∑
k 6=i
qˆk(1|bˆi), q(1|bˆi)). The rest follows by the definition of
q∗(1).
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3 Summary of Main Result and Proof
In this section, we introduce our modified peer prediction mechanism and sketch the main theorem
of this paper, that for almost any symmetric prior, there exists a modified peer prediction mecha-
nism such that truth-telling is the focal equilibrium. In subsequent sections, we build up pieces of
the proof of this theorem. Recall, we use the term focal to refer to an equilibrium with expected
payoff strictly higher than that of any other Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Our Modified Peer Prediction Mechanism MPPM
Recall that modified peer prediction mechanism is the mechanism wherein players are paid accord-
ing the peer prediction based on a carefully-designed proper scoring rule, modulo some punishment
imposed on the all playing 0 or all playing 1 strategy profiles. So our approach differentiates
between two types of equilibria:
Definition 3.1 (Informative strategy). We call always reporting 1 and always reporting 0 unin-
formative strategies; we call all other strategies (equilibria) informative.
Designing the Optimal Peer Prediction Mechanism We start to describe our modified peer
prediction mechanism MPPM. We use two steps to design our MPPM. First we define the PPM:
Definition 3.2. Given any binary, symmetric, positively correlated, and signal asymmetric prior
Q, with q(1|1) > q(0|0) (the q(0|0) < q(1|1) case is analogous), we first design our peer prediction
mechanism PPM(Q) and represent is as a payoff function matrix (See Definition 2.5). PPM(Q)
depends on the region Q belongs to, we defer the definitions of regions R1, R2, R3 to Definition 6.3.
1 If Q ∈ R1, then PPM(Q) =M1(Q)
2 If Q ∈ R2, then PPM(Q) =M2(Q)
3 If Q ∈ R3, then we pick a small number  > 0 and PPM(Q, ) =M3(Q, )
where
M1(Q) =
 ζ(Q) 0
0 1
, M2(Q) =
 1 0
0 η(Q)
, M3(Q, ) =
 ζ(Q, ) δ(Q, )
0 1

and
0 ≤ ζ(Q), η(Q) ≤ 1 are constants that only depend on common prior Q. 0 ≤ ζ(Q, ), δ(Q, ) ≤ 1
are constants that only depend on common prior Q and  > 01.
Note that actually PPM(Q) is a quite simple mechanism. We use region R1 as example: if the
prior belongs to region R1, for every i, agent i will receive 0 payment if the agent paired with agent
1Actually ζ(Q) =
√
q(0|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q(1|1) , η(Q) =
1
q(1|1) (
√
(q(1|1)−q(1|0))(q(1|1)−q(0|0))
q(0|0)q(1|0) − q(0|1)),
ζ(Q, ) = q(0|0)q(0|1)
q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)++q(1|0)(q(1|1)−q(1|1)q(0|0)+) , and
δ(Q, ) = q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(0|0)+−1)
2−q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)+2
q(0|0)+(q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(0|0)+−1)−q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)+) .
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i, call him agent j, reports different signal than him. If both agent i and agent j report 1, agent i
will receive a payment of 0 ≤ ζ(Q) ≤ 1, if both agent i and agent j report 0, agent i will receive
payment of 1.
Actually for regions R1, R2, the PPM(Q) we define here is the optimal peer prediction mech-
anism in that it maximizes the advantage of truth-telling over the informative equilibria which
have the second largest expected payoff over all Peer-prediction mechanisms with payoffs in [0, 1].
For region R3, the optimal peer prediction mechanism does not exist, but the advantage of the
PPM(Q, ) we define approaches the optimal advantage as  goes to 0.
Definition 3.3. We define ∆∗(Q) to be the supremum of the advantage of truth-telling over the
informative equilibria which have the second largest expected payoff over all Peer-prediction mech-
anisms with payoffs in [0, 1].
Add Punishment In our PPM(Q), an uninformative strategy can still obtain the highest payoff.
For example, in mechanismM1, agents will receive maximal payment 1 by simply always reporting
0.
Our final MPPM(Q) Mechanism is the same as the PPM(Q) except that we add a punishment
designed to hurt the all 0 or all 1 equilibria.
Definition 3.4. Our Modified Peer-Prediction Mechanism MPPM(Q) (or MPPM(Q, ) if Q ∈
R3) has payoffs identical to PPM(Q) (or MPM(Q, )) except that, in the event all the other
agents play all 0 or all 1, it will issue an agent a punishment of p = 1−t2(1−Q) +
∆∗(Q)
2Q
where Q is
the maximum probability that a fixed set of n − 1 agents receive the same signal (either all 0 or
all 1); t is the expected of payoff of truth-telling T in the PPM(Q), and ∆∗(Q) is as defined in
Definition 3.3.
To make truth-telling focal, we need to impose a punishment to the agents if everyone else
reports the same signal. However, such a punishment may distort the equilibria of the mechanism.
To avoid this, we punish an agent by p when all the other agents report the same signal. Because an
agent’s strategy does not influence his punishment, his marginal benefit for deviation remains the
same and so the equilibrium remain the same. However, while all 0 and all 1 remain equilibrium,
in them, MPPM(Q) will punish each agent by p.
A difficulty arises: if the number of agents is too small like 2 or 3, it is possible (and even prob-
able) that all agents report their true signals, yet are still punished by the MPPM(Q) mechanism.
Punishments like this might distort the payoffs among the informative equilibrium. However, if Q
(the probability that n − 1 agents receives the same signal) is sufficient small, this is no longer a
problem. For most reasonable priors, as the number of agents increases, Q will go to zero. Formally
we will need that the number of agents is large enough such that Q <
∆∗(Q)
1−t+∆∗(Q) .
If the number of agents is too small such that Q ≤ ∆
∗(Q)
1−t+∆∗(Q) , we cannot show that MPPM(Q)
has truth-telling as a focal equilibrium.
In particular, we can see if Q → 0 (say as the number of agents increases), then at some point,
truth-telling will be focal. We know that such a limit is necessary because, for example, with two
agents making truth-telling focal is impossible.
Note that if the prior tells us the probability of a 1 event is concentrated far away from 0 and
1, the number of agents we need to make truth-telling focal will be very small since uninformative
equilibria (all 1 and all 0) are far away from truth-telling. To give a feeling of the actual number
needed to make truth-telling focal, we calculated it for a prior that is not very “good”: the prob-
ability p of a 1 event is uniformly drawn from [0.5,0.9] (This prior means we only know 1 event is
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more likely to be happen and with at least 0.1, 0 event will happen). Even for this prior, we only
need at most 30 agents.
Theorem 3.5. (Main Theorem (Informal)) Let Q be a binary, symmetric, positively correlated
and signal asymmetric prior, and let Q be the maximum probability that a fixed set of n− 1 agents
receive the same signal (either all 0 or all 1). Then
1. In our PPM, truth-telling has the largest expected payoff among all informative equilibria.
Moreover, over the space of Peer-Prediction mechanisms, our PPM(Q) maximizes the ad-
vantage truth-telling has over the informative equilibrium which have the second largest ex-
pected payoff, over all Peer-prediction mechanisms with payoffs in [0, 1] for regions R1, R2
and PPM(Q, ) approaches the maximal advantage for region R3 as  goes to 0.
2. There exists a constant ξq(1|1),q(1|0) which only depends on q(1|1) and q(1|0) such that, if
Q < ξ, our MPPM(Q) makes truth-telling focal.
The main theorem is proved in four steps. First, we classify all of the equilibria of the peer
prediction mechanism, using the best response plot as a technical tool (see Section 4). Second, using
the best response payoff plot, we are able to compare the payoffs between informative equilibria (see
Section 5). Third, we show that by carefully selecting the scoring rule on which peer-prediction is
based, truthtelling can be made focal among informative equilibria, and are even able to optimize
the advantage of truth-telling over the other informative equilibria (see Section 6). Finally, we
suitably punish the uninformative equilibria, so that their payoff is lower than that of truthtelling
(see Section 7).
4 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we discuss the multiple equilibria of binary peer prediction games instantiated with
strict proper scoring rules. We show that there are between 7 and 9 symmetric Bayesian Nash
Equilibria in these mechanisms.
Theorem 4.1. Let Q be a symmetric and positively correlated prior on {0, 1}n, and let M be a
peer-prediction mechanism run with a strictly proper scoring rule with break-even q∗ (Definition 2.8.
Then there are no asymmetric equilibria. All equilibria are symmetric and only depend on q∗; they
are
0,1,T,
(
0→ q∗
1→ q∗
)
,
(
0→ 0
1→ q∗q(1|1)
)
,
(
0→ q∗−q(1|0)q(0|0)
1→ 1
)
and also conditionally include
F if q(0|1) ≤ q∗ ≤ q(0|0) (3)(
0→ 1
1→ q∗−q(0|1)q(1|1)
)
if q(0|1) ≤ q∗ (4)(
0→ q∗q(0|0)
1→ 0
)
if q∗ ≤ q(0|0) (5)
We denote the set of all equilibria by ΨQ(q
∗).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the multiple equilibria of peer prediction for Example 2.7.
Because either the conditions of Equation 4 or of Equation 5 are satisfied, there are always
between 7 and 9 equilibria. Additionally, we note that if the conditions of Equation 4 or 5 are
equalities, then the corresponding equilibrium is equivalent to the F equilibrium.
Figure 1 shows the 7 equilibria that exist in Example 2.7 using the Brier scoring rule (see A.1),
which are 0,1,T, (
0→ q∗
1→ q∗
)
≈
(
0→ .594
1→ .594
)
,(
0→ 0
1→ q∗q(1|1)
)
≈
(
0→ 0
1→ .955
)
,(
0→ q∗−q(1|0)q(0|0)
1→ 1
)
≈
(
0→ .064
1→ 1
)
, and(
0→ 1
1→ q∗−q(0|1)q(1|1)
)
≈
(
0→ 1
1→ .348
)
.
Note that to the right of the red line where qˆ(1|0) = q∗, the best response is to increase θ(1|0); to
the left of the red line, the best response is to decrease θ(1|0); and on the line an agent is indifferent.
Similarly, above the blue line where qˆ(1|1) = q∗, the best response is to increase θ(1|1); below the
blue line, the best response is to decrease θ(1|1); and on the line an agent is indifferent.
If Example 2.7 were such that q∗ were closer to 1/2, then the red line would intersect the
bottom half of the square and there would be two additional equilibria, one at F and the other at
the intersection. Exactly 8 equilibria would exist if the intersection of the red line with the edges
of the square were exactly at F.
4.1 Best Response Plots
We introduce a new tool for the analysis of proper scoring rules, the best response plot (see Figure 2
for an example); these plots are the main tool we use in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Given any scoring
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rule, one can draw its corresponding best response plot. Each point (x, y) on a best response plot
corresponds to a strategy of the game: the x-axis indicates the probability of reporting 1 when
one observes 0; the y-axis the probability of reporting 1 when one observes 1. At any point on
the plot, we suppose that all players other than a single fixed player i play the same fixed strategy
(the strategy corresponding to that point of the plot), and we examine the best response of i,
given that fixed strategy. Since we will show that no asymmetric equilibria exist, intuitively, the
question of whether a particular point on the best response plot corresponds to an equilibrium
of the mechanism is simply the question of whether responding with that same strategy is a best
response for i.
Intuitively, when the number of other players who will report 1 is high, agent i’s report should
also be 1, no matter what he observes; when the number of other players who will report 1 is low,
his report should also be 0. There exists a “break-even” point where agent i is indifferent between
reporting 1 and reporting 0. We will use this break-even point to divide the plot into four regions:
the horizontal axis is the break-even point indicating i’s indifference between reporting 1 versus 0
when he observes a signal of 0; the vertical axis is the break-even point when he observes 1. Above
the horizontal axis, agent i prefers to report 1 when he observes a 1. Left of the vertical axis, agent
i prefers to report 0 when he observes a 0. Thus, in the upper-left region, agent i prefers to tell the
truth. In other words, the best response of agent i is truth-telling T when qˆ−i is in the upper-left
region, which is why it is labelled RT (we label other regions similarly).
We want to select the proper scoring rule in order that truth-telling will have higher expected
payoff than any other equilibrium. Different scoring rules may have different equilibria, which seems
to pose a challenge to their analysis. However, by studying the best response plot, we will
show that the set of equilibria only depends on the value of the break-even point, and
not on any other aspects of the proper scoring rule. This property will allow us to easily classify
proper scoring rules by their equilibria.
Now we will introduce the best response plot in detail. The best response plot is a plot which,
given θA′ (the “average” strategy of the agents in A
′), maps it to the point qˆA′(1|0), qˆA′(1|1). For
example,
(
0→ 0
1→ 1
)
would map to (q(1|0), q(1|1)), and
(
0→ 1
1→ 1
)
would map to (1, 1). Because
we assume q(1|1) > q(1|0), this map is a bijection. Since it is a bijection, we will abuse notation a
little by using qˆA′(1|0), qˆA′(1|1) to represent θA′ .
The four pure strategies T, F, 0, 1 are mapped to four distinct points in the best response plot.
We abuse notation and call these four points in the best response plot T, F, 0, 1.
We define R to be the convex hull defined by the points in S (recall S is the set of pure
strategies).
Recall that X = {0→ 0, 0→ 1, 1→ 0, 1→ 1} is the set of all possible best responses. We define
the support of an agent’s strategy Supp(θi) ⊆ X to be the set of all responses that the agent uses
with non-zero probability. For example, for the strategy that is always reporting 1 with probability
1
2 and ignoring the private signal received, its support is X. For pure strategy like T, its support
is itself {0→ 0, 1→ 1}.
For W ⊆ X, let
RW = {p ∈ R | ∀r ∈W, r is a best response when qˆ−i = p}.
For example, when W = {0 → 0, 1 → 1} = T, RW is the upper left region. When W = {T,0},
RW is the left part of x axis (which actually is the intersection of RT and R0).
Actually, we abuse notation in two further ways. First, given s ∈ S we define
Rs = ∩r∈Supp(s)Rr
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Figure 2: A best response plot. Given fixed strategies for the players other than i, the x axis
indicates the number of people who will report 1 when agent i observes 0; the y axis indicates the
number of people who will report 1 when agent i observes 1. The horizontal axis is the break-even
point indicating i’s indifference between reporting 1 versus 0 when he observes a signal of 0; the
vertical axis is the break-even point when he observes 1. Above the horizontal axis, agent i prefers
to report 1 when he observes a 1. Left of the vertical axis, agent i prefers to report 0 when he
observes a 0. Thus, in the upper-left region, agent i prefers to tell the truth. In other words, the
best response of agent i is truth-telling T when qˆ−i is in the upper-left region, which is why it is
labelled RT (we label other regions similarly). Since F is in the RF region, F is an equilibrium.
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Figure 3: In these best response plots, F is not an equilibrium.
to divide R into four quadrants: RF, RT, R0, R1. We also extend these quadrants to partition the
entire plane.
Given a finite set of points P , we define Conv(P ) as the convex hull of P . Given a convex set
U ⊆ Rk, let Int(U) denote the interior points of U and let ∂(U) denote the boundary of U (so that
U is the disjoint union of Int(U) and ∂(U)).
We name some additional points of our best response plot. We define T1 = ∂(R) ∩ R{T,1},
T0 = ∂(R) ∩R{T,0}, F1 = ∂(R) ∩R{F,1}, F0 = ∂(R) ∩R{F,0}, if they exist. (See Figure 2.)
Notice that in the best response plot, T ∈ RT, 1 ∈ R1, and 0 ∈ R0, but F may not be in RF.
(See Figure 3.) When q(1|1) ≥ q(1|0), if q(0|0) < q∗, then F /∈ RF; if q(0|0) ≥ q∗, then F ∈ RF.
When q(1|1) < q(0|0), if q(0|1) > q∗, then F /∈ RF; if q(0|1) ≤ q∗, then F ∈ RF. It turns out that
these two cases (i.e., whether F lies in RF or not) create large differences in the structure of the
equilibria.
Claim 4.2. (θ1, ..., θn) is an equilibrium iff ∀i,
qˆ−i ∈ RSupp(θi)
Proof. (θ1, ..., θn) is an equilibrium iff ∀i, any strategy in Supp(θi) is a best response for player i;
this means that qˆ−i ∈
⋂
s∈Supp(θi)
Rs = RSupp(θi) ∀i.
Note that we mentioned before that there is a bijection between θi and qˆi, for convenience, we
sometimes write this claim as
qˆ−i ∈ RSupp(qˆi)
4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We will use the best response plot as a tool to compute all the equilibria of the peer prediction
mechanism. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we use the best response plot to find some
symmetric equilibria. Second, we show that no asymmetric equilibria nor additional symmetric
equilibria exist. At this point, we have classified all equilibria in terms of qˆ. The third step inverts
the mapping from θ to qˆ to solve for the equilibria in terms of θ.
Symmetric equilibria There are two basic cases: first F ∈ RF and second F 6∈ RF. If (θ, θ, ..., θ)
is a symmetric equilibrium, recall, we will use θ to refer to it.
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Lemma 4.3. For each condition below, we prove existence of a set of symmetric equilibria of the
peer prediction mechanism.
If F ∈ RF then T,F,0,1,T0,T1,F0,F1,Q∗ are symmetric equilibria.
If F ∈ R0/RF then T,0,1,T0,T1,F1,Q∗ are symmetric equilibria.
If F ∈ R1/RF then T,0,1,T0,T1,F0,Q∗ are symmetric equilibria.
Proof. All points are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
Notice that it is always true that T ∈ RT,1 ∈ R1,0 ∈ R0. There are two cases: F ∈ RF or
F /∈ RF.
We first consider F ∈ RF. T is a symmetric equilibrium since if ∀i, qˆi = T (θi = T), then
we have ∀i, qˆ−i = T and Supp(T) = T. Based on Claim 4.2, T is a symmetric equilibrium.
Similarly, F,1,0 are symmetric equilibria as well. T1 is a symmetric equilibrium since if ∀i,
qˆi = T1 (θi = T1), then we have ∀i, qˆ−i = T1 and Supp(T1) = {T,1}. Based on Claim 4.2,
T1 is a symmetric equilibrium. Similarly, T0,F1,F0 are symmetric equilibria as well. Q∗ is a
symmetric equilibrium since if ∀i, qˆi = Q∗, then we have ∀i, qˆ−i = Q∗ and Supp(Q∗) = X. Based
on Claim 4.2, Q∗ is a symmetric equilirium.
Next, we consider F /∈ RF; the results are proved similarly. But notice that in this case, F is
not a equilibrium since qˆ−i = F /∈ RF. Also note, F0 does not exist when F ∈ R0/RF, and F1
does not exist when F ∈ R1/RF.
There are no asymmetric equilibria We will be aided by the following proposition, which
states that once we have shown that all the qˆi are in the same quadrant, if even one agent is in the
interior, then all qˆi must be (q
∗, q∗).
Proposition 4.4. For any equilibrium, if there exists s ∈ S such that for all i, qˆi ∈ Rs, and there
exists an agent j such that qˆj ∈ Int(R), then it must be that for all i, qˆi = (q∗, q∗).
Proof. Because qˆi ∈ Int(R), we know that Supp(qˆi) = X, meaning qˆi has full support. Based on
Claim 4.2, we have qˆ−i = Q∗. Then the average of qˆj , for j 6= i, is an extreme point of Rs ∩ R,
which is a convex set. Since all qˆj , j 6= i are in Rs ∩ R, we will have ∀j 6= i, qˆj = Q∗. Now we
examine agent j 6= i, because qˆj = Q∗ ∈ Int(R), by the same reason we know qˆi = Q∗ as well.
We now show that the peer prediction mechanism does not have asymmetric equilibria.
Lemma 4.5. Let Q be a symmetric and positively correlated prior on {0, 1}n, and let M be a
corresponding peer-prediction mechanism. There are no asymmetric equilibria of the mechanism.
Proof. To prove Lemma 4.5 we will consider two cases: first F ∈ RF and second F 6∈ RF. For each
case we will prove the Lemma in two different steps. In the first step we will show that for any
equilibrium, qˆi is in the same quadrant of the best response plot for all agents. In the next step we
will show that, in fact, all the qˆi must be the same for all agents, and moreover must be one of the
equilibria detailed in the statement of Lemma 4.3.
Case 1, Step 1: Showing that if F ∈ RF, then all qˆi are in the same quadrant. First,
we show that either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→0 or ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→1. Second, we show that either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R0→0 or
∀i, qˆi ∈ R0→1. This will complete step 1.
For the sake of contradiction, we assume that it is not the case that either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→0 or
∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→1. Then there exist agent i and agent j such that qˆi(1|1) > q∗ and qˆj(1|1) < q∗, which
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implies that 1→ 1 ∈ Supp(qˆi) and 1→ 0 ∈ Supp(qˆj). If qˆ−{i,j}(1|1) ≥ q∗, then qˆ−j(1|1) > q∗, which
means qˆ−j /∈ R1→0. But this is a contradiction, due to Claim 4.2. The analysis for qˆ−{i,j}(1|1) < q∗
is similar.
The proof for either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R0→0 pr ∀i, qˆi ∈ R0→1 is similar to the previous proof when F ∈ RF.
Case 1, Step 2: Showing that if F ∈ RF, then all qˆi are the same and are equal to one
of {T,T1, T0,Q∗,F,F1,F0,1,0}. We prove the Claim when ∀i, qˆi ∈ RT. The remaining cases
proceed similarly.
We first consider when ∃i such that qˆi /∈ ∂(R). By Proposition 4.4, we have ∀i, qˆi = Q∗.
Next we consider when ∀i, qˆi ∈ ∂(R). If ∀i, qˆi = T then this a symmetric equilibrium T.
Otherwise, there exists i such that either Supp(qˆi) = {T,1} or Supp(qˆi) = {T,0}. If Supp(qˆi) =
{T,1}, then based on Claim 4.2, qˆ−i ∈ Conv(RT∩∂(R))∩R{T,1} = {T1}, which means qˆ−i = T1.
Then the average of qˆj , j 6= i is an extreme point of a convex set RT ∩R. Since all qˆj , j 6= i are in
RT ∩R, we will have ∀j 6= i, qˆj = T1. Now we examine agent j 6= i, because qˆj = T1, by the same
reason we know qˆi = T1 as well. The proof for Supp(qˆi) = {T,0} is similar.
The results for other quadrants are shown similarly. In summary, we show (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) is an
equilibrium iff all qˆi are the same and are equal to one of T,T1,T0,Q
∗,F,F1,F0,1,0.
Case 2, Step 1: Showing that if F 6∈ RF, then all qˆi are in the same quadrant. Notice
that under the case F /∈ RF, when q(1|1) > q(0|0), F ∈ R0; when q(1|1) ≤ q(0|0), F ∈ R1. We
show the proof for q(1|1) ≥ q(0|0) and F ∈ R0. The other case, when q(1|1) < q(0|0) and F ∈ R1,
is analogous.
First, we show that either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→0 or ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→1. For the sake of contradiction, we
assume that it is not the case that either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→0 or ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→1. Then there exist agent i
and agent j such that qˆi(1|1) > q∗ and qˆj(1|1) < q∗. If qˆ−{i,j}(1|1) ≥ q∗, then qˆ−j(1|1) > q∗ which
means qˆ−j /∈ R1→0, but this is a contradiction based on Claim 4.2. The analysis for qˆ−{i,j}(1|1) < q∗
is similar.
But to show either ∀i, qˆi ∈ R0→0 or ∀i, qˆi ∈ R0→1 we cannot use the same approach as before.
We will show it under two cases by contradiction:
First, we consider when ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→1. (This is illustrated in Figure 3 when all points are in
upper half-plane):
If qˆi(1|0) > q∗, qˆj(1|0) < q∗ and qˆ−{i,j}(1|0) ≥ q∗, combining with ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→1, we obtain i ∈
R1, j ∈ RT. Then T ∈ Supp(qˆj) while qˆ−j /∈ RT∪R0 which is a contradiction. If qˆ−{i,j}(1|0) < q∗,
then 1 ∈ Supp(qˆi) while qˆ−i /∈ R1 ∪RF, which is a contradiction.
Next we consider when ∀i, qˆi ∈ R1→0. (This is illustrated in Figure 3 when all points are in
lower half-plane):
If qˆi(1|0) > q∗, qˆj(1|0) < q∗ and qˆ−{i,j}(1|0) ≤ q∗, we have i ∈ RF, j ∈ R0. Then F ∈ Supp(qˆi)
while qˆ−i /∈ R1 ∪RF, which is a contradiction.
If qˆi(1|0) > q∗, qˆj(1|0) < q∗ and qˆ−{i,j}(1|0) > q∗, then qˆ−j /∈ RT ∪ R0. But even if j ∈ R0,
we do not have the fact that 0 ∈ Supp(qˆj), since F ∈ R0 and qˆj can be F, whose support set only
contains F. We cannot obtain a contradition using the previous way. We prove it in two steps:
first, we show that qˆj(1|1) is strictly less than q∗; second, we show that when qˆj(1|1) is strictly less
than q∗, qˆi(1|0) cannot be strictly greater than q∗.
Based on Claim 4.2, Supp(qˆj) ⊆ {F,1}, which means qˆj is on the line incident on F and 1.
Combining with the fact that qˆj ∈ R0, we have qˆj(1|1) < q∗, then qˆ−i(1|1) < q∗. Since qˆ−i(1|1) < q∗,
based on Claim 4.2, Supp(θi) ⊆ {F,0} while qˆi(1|0) > q∗ ⇒ qˆi /∈ R0 which is a contradition since
both F and 0 are in R0.
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Case 2, Step 2: Showing that if F 6∈ RF, the all qˆi are the same and are equal to one of
T,T1,T0,Q∗,F1,
1,0 if F ∈ R0 or T,T1,T0,Q∗,F1,1,0 if F ∈ R1. The analyses for all points in RT and R1
are similar to the previous analysis under the case where F ∈ RF. We will show the analyses for
RF and R0 here.
First, if all points are in the same quadrant and there is i such that qˆi is not on the boundary,
then ∀i, qˆi = Q∗, based on Proposition 4.4. So then we only need to consider the case when all
points are on the boundary.
If ∀i, qˆi ∈ RF ∩ ∂(R), then ∃i such that Supp(θi) = {1,F}. We have qˆ−i = R{1,F} ∩ ∂(R) = F1.
Then since F1 is an extreme point and all points are in RF, we have ∀j 6= i, qˆj = F1 and based on
the same reasoning, qˆi = F1, as well.
If ∀i, qˆi ∈ qˆi ∈ R0 ∩ ∂(R), when ∀i, qˆi = 0, then this is a symmetric equilibrium. Otherwise:
(a) When ∃i such that Supp(qˆi) = {T,0}:
In Claim 4.2, qˆ−i ∈ Conv(R0 ∩ ∂(R)) ∩ R{T,0} = {T0} which means qˆ−i = T0. Then since
T0 is an extreme point of R0 ∩ R and ∀j, qˆj ∈ R0 ∩ R, we have ∀j 6= i, qˆj = T0. We also
have qˆi = T0 based on the same reason since Supp(T0) = {T,0}. So we have ∀i, qˆi = T0.
(b) When ∃i such that Supp(qˆi) = {F,1}:
Based on Claim 4.2, qˆ−i ∈ Conv(R0 ∩ ∂(R)) ∩ R{F,1} = ∅ which means situation (b) is
impossible, that is, there does not exist any i such that Supp(qˆi) = {F,1}.
(c) When ∃i such that Supp(qˆi) = {F,0} or qˆi = F:
Based on Claim 4.2, qˆ−i ∈ Conv(R0 ∩ ∂(R)) ∩RF. Conv(R0 ∩ ∂(R)) ∩RF is a point and let
FF1 denote it. qˆ−i = FF1. Then since FF1 is an extreme point, we have ∀j 6= i, qˆj = FF1.
So Supp(qˆj) is {F,1} while qˆ−j /∈ RF when Supp(qˆi) = {F,0} or qˆi = F. However, we already
proved there does not exist any i such that Supp(qˆi) = {F,1}, so situation (c) cannot happen
as well.
In summary, we show (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) is an equilibrium iff all qˆi are the same and are equal to one
of T,T1,T0,Q∗,F1,1,0.
Now we consider the case when q(1|1) ≤ q(0|0). Then F ∈ R1, and, based on a similar analysis
as before, we show that (θ1, θ2, ..., θn) is an equilibrium iff all qˆi are the same and are equal to one
of T,T1,T0,Q∗,F0,1,0.
Translating from best response plot back to strategy profiles We calculate the strategies
that are mapped to T0,F1,T1,F0.
For T0, setting qˆ(1|1) = q∗ and θ(1|0) = 0 in Equation 2 we get
q∗ = θ(1|1)q(1|1)⇒ θ(1|1) = q
∗
q(1|1) .
For F1, setting qˆ(1|1) = q∗ and θ(1|0) = 1 in Equation 2 we get
q∗ = q(0|1) + θ(1|1)q(1|1)⇒ θ(1|1) = q
∗ − q(0|1)
q(1|1) .
For T1, this is analogous to the case where players receiving 0 always tell the truth and players
receiving 1 sometimes lie, and the result follows by the above calculations by simply switching the
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labels 0 and 1. Before we showed that θ(1|1) = q∗q(1|1) . Switching the labels gives us:
θ(0|0) = q
∗(0)
q(0|0) ⇒ θ(1|0) = 1−
1− q∗
q(0|0) =
q∗ − q(1|0)
q(0|0) .
For F0, this is analogous to the case where players receiving 0 always lie and players receiving
1 sometimes lie, and the result follows by the above calculations by simply switching the labels 0
and 1.
θ(0|0) = q
∗(0)− q(1|0)
q(0|0) ⇒ θ(1|0) = 1−
1− q∗ − q(1|0)
q(0|0) =
q∗
q(0|0) .
5 Making truth-telling focal among the informative equilibria
In this section, we first introduce a useful concept, line sets, and then we build up a sequence
of lemmas that will be useful in Section 6. Along the way, we show Theorem 5.4, that there
exists a proper scoring rule that makes truth-telling have higher payoff than any other informative
equilibrium.
5.1 Line Sets
We now introduce notation that highlights the role of three constants that will emerge as the key
defining parameters of any proper scoring rule. Useful related observations related to scoring rules
appear in Appendix A.
Definition 5.1. We define a (α, β, q∗, γ) line-set as a set of linear functions {`(x, 0), `(x, 1)} where
`(x, 0) = α(x − q∗) + γ, `(x, 1) = β(x − q∗) + γ. We say a proper scoring rule and a (α, β, q∗, γ)
line-set correspond if
PS(x, q(1|b)) = `(x, b).
Notice that there is a natural mapping from a (α, β, q∗, γ) line-set to payoff fucntion matrix(
`(1, 1) `(1, 0)
`(0, 1) `(0, 0)
)
.
It is useful to note that arbitrary convex functions can be converted into scoring rules as follows.
Fact 5.2. [9] Given any (strictly) convex, differentiable function r : R → R, and any arbitrary
function h : R → R, the function PS(p, q) := −r(p) + r(q) +∇r(q) · (p − q) + h(p) is a (strictly)
proper scoring rule. Note that the first three terms are the negation of the Bregman divergence of
r.2
As a consequence, for a certain class of α, β, q∗, and γ, one can find a corresponding proper
scoring rule.
Lemma 5.3. Given any (α, β, q∗, γ) line-set (or payoff function) with β < α and q∗ ∈ [0, 1], there
exists a strictly proper scoring rule that corresponds to this line-set.
Proof. Essentially, appealing to Fact 5.2, our goal is to produce a strictly convex function r and an
arbitrary h(·) such that the proper scoring rule constructed via the Bregman divergence matches the
desired scoring rule at q = q(1|0) and q = q(1|1). This gives constraints on r that ∇r(q(1|0)) = β
and ∇r(q(1|1)) = α, and r(q(1|1))− r(q(1|0)) = α(q(1|1)− q∗)− β(q(1|0)− q∗).
2A more general version in higher dimensions also holds, as does a converse of the equivalence. However, we do
not use these stronger statements here.
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These two tangent lines to r, at q(1|0) and q(1|1), intersect at q∗. Recall that q(1|0) < q∗ <
q(1|1). Thus, between q(1|0) and q(1|1), one can construct r(·) as a quadratic Bezier curve given
r(q(1|0)), r(q(1|1)), and their intersection at q∗. Outside of [q(1|0), q(1|1)], one can extend r(·) with
a spline.
5.2 Making truth-telling focal among informative equilibria
Informally, the following theorem states that under a weak condition, there is a (α, β, q∗, γ) line-
set such that the proper scoring rule satisfying this line-set makes truth-telling focal among all
informative equilibria.
Theorem 5.4. Let Q be a symmetric and positively correlated prior over binary signals. Then
there exists r > 0 such that for any strictly proper scoring rule that corresponds to a (α, β, q∗, γ)
line-set with r = −αβ , the payoff of T is no less than that of any other informative equilibrium.
Moreover, if q(1|0) 6= q(0|1), q(1|1) 6= q∗, and q(0|0) 6= q∗, the payoff of T is strictly greater than
that of any other informative equilibrium.
Motivation for Best Response Payoff Plot We want to select a proper scoring rule in order
that truth-telling will have higher expected payoff than any other equilibrium. If we just compute
the average payoffs of agents playing symmetric strategies, then even for the simplest proper-
scoring rules, these payoff curves are paraboloid, and hence difficult to analyze directly. Instead
we will analyse the payoffs of the best-responses. Because the best responses are the same in each
quadrant, the best response payoff plot is piece-wise linear for all proper scoring rules, which makes
the analysis tractable.
A key tool will be the best response payoff plot which is defined by extending the definition of
the best response plot to include not only the best response strategy, but additionally the expected
payoff of playing this best-response strategy. A contour on the plot corresponds to a set of points
that have identical best response payoffs. A key observation is that for any equilibrium, agent i’s
payoff is equal to his best response payoff (this is not true for non-equilibrium strategy profile).
Since the best response payoff of any equilibrium is equal to that equilibrium’s payoff, the
contour plot can be used to compare the payoffs of different equilibria.
The rest of this section will formally define the best response payoff and the contour plot, and
finally give a proof outline. The actual proof is in Section 5.3.
Best Response Payoff We extend the definition of the best response plot of Section 4.1. We
only consider symmetric strategies (because we have shown that all the equilibria are symmetric).
However, we fix some player i and consider his best response when all of the other players are
playing some symmetric strategy (qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1)); we write the payoff of this best response as
BR(·, ·).
BR(qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1)) = q(0)
(
max
b0∈{0,1}
`(qˆ−i(1|0), b0)
)
+ q(1)
(
max
b1∈{0,1}
`(qˆ−i(1|1), b1)
)
.
Now notice that we can express q(1), the probability a priori that a player receives a signal of
one, in terms of q(1|0) and q(1|1):
q(1) = q(0) · q(1|0) + q(1) · q(1|1)
= (1− q(1)) · q(1|0) + q(1) · q(1|1)
=
q(1|0)
1− q(1|1) + q(1|0) .
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This allows us to express the best expected payoff BR(qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1)) only in terms of q(1|0),
q(1|1), qˆ−i(1|0), and qˆ−i(1|1).
Contour Plot We introduce the notion of a contour plot depicting BR(qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1)), where
the x and y axes are, respectively, qˆ−i(1|0) and qˆ−i(1|1). A contour on a contour plot corresponds
to the set of points such that
BR(qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1)) = ν,
for some constant ν. An important observation is that for any equilibrium, agent i’s payoff is equal
to his best response payoff (this is not true in general).
Proof Outline The main tool we use to prove Lemma 5.4 is the contour plot. Since the best
response payoff of any equilibrium is equal to that equilibrium’s payoff, the contour plot can be
used to compare the payoffs of different equilibria. The plot is centered at (q∗, q∗) and thus the
four quadrants, R1, R0, RF, RT, correspond to whether each of qˆ−i(1|0) and qˆ−i(1|1) is greater or
less than q∗. By the definition of q∗, each quadrant corresponds to a different best response.
We will first show that in each quadrant, a contour is actually a line whose slope depends
only on the ratio of the slopes, βα , from a (α, β, q
∗, γ)-line set. These lines make it easier for us
to compare the payoffs of various equilibria: the further a line is from the center Q∗ of the plot,
the higher its payoff is. We want to be able to compare the lines that go through the equilibrium
points in some way, but unfortunately, the equilibria are not necessarily all in the same quadrant.
Surprisingly, we are able to define a mapping that translates lines from one quadrant to another in a
way that preserves the payoffs at equilibrium and does not depend on the values of α and β. When
all translated equilibria are in the same quadrant, we will show that truth telling is an extreme
point of the convex hull H of all translated informative equilibria. We do so using Lemma 5.10,
which pairs up equilibria such that the lines going through each pair of equilibria are parallel, and
such that the truthful equilibrium is on the highest payoff line amongst the informative equilibria
(see Figure 4). Once we show Lemma 5.10, we can see by taking α and β such that the slope of
the contours in RT equals the slope the line incident on the two extreme equilibria adjacent to
truth-telling, we ensure that the truthful equilibrium pays at least well any other equilibrium (see
Corollary 5.11). Based on Lemma 5.10 and Corollary 5.11, we show Lemma 5.4.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 5.4
Our goal is to find a (α, β, q∗, γ)-line set, making the truthful equilibrium at least as good as any
other equilibrium. Since the difference between the payoffs of any two equilibria does not depend
on γ, we can assume γ = 0 now without loss of generality, but will in Section 6 discuss the value
of γ in the context of maximizing the payoff of truth-telling with respect to other equilibria. (We
will see that the result of Theorem 6.4 is obtained by properly choosing α, β, γ.)
The claim below will help us construct a mapping that translates lines from one quadrant to
another in a way that preserves the payoffs at equilibrium and does not depend on the values of α
and β.
Claim 5.5. 1. In every quadrant, the contour of the best response payoff function is a line.
2. The slope of the contours of the best response payoff function in both R1 and R0 is − q(1)q(0) =
− q(1|0)q(0|1) and does not depend on the parameters α, β.
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3. The best payoff of any point (x, y) can be decomposed as the sum of the best payoff of (x, q∗)
and the best payoff of (q∗, y)
Proof of Claim 5.5. Recall that we assume q(1|1) > q(1|0).
Table 1: illustrates the best response payoff for a (α, β, q∗, γ)-line set in each quadrant
Quadrant Best response payoff when other players play (x,y)
R1 q(0)`(x, 1) + q(1)`(y, 1) = α(q(0)(x− q∗) + q(1)(y − q∗))
RT q(0)`(x, 0) + q(1)`(y, 1) = β(q(0)(x− q∗)) + α(q(1)(y − q∗))
R0 q(0)`(x, 0) + q(1)`(y, 0) = β(q(0)(x− q∗) + q(1)(y − q∗))
RF q(0)`(x, 1) + q(1)`(y, 0) = α(q(0)(x− q∗)) + β(q(1)(y − q∗))
In Table 1, the best response for each quadrant is the best response of agent i when (qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1))
is in that quadrant. This comes from the fact that
BR(qˆ−i(1|0), qˆ−i(1|1)) = q(0)
(
max
b0∈0,1
`(qˆ−i(1|0), b0)
)
+ q(1)
(
max
b1∈0,1
`(qˆ−i(1|1), b1)
)
.
and that the best response of a player i who gets bit b is 0 if qˆ−i(1|b) < q∗, and 1 if qˆ−i(1|b) > q∗.
Part (1) of the claim follows immediately from Table 1. We can also observe from Table 1 that
when α, β 6= 0, the slope of the contours in both R1 and R0 are − q(0)q(1) = − q(0|1)q(1|0) , so part (2) follows.
Part (3) of the claim follows since in the best response plot, (x, y), (x, q∗) and (y, q∗) are in the
same quadrant. If they are in the RT region, according to Table 1, the best response payoff of
(x, y) is
βq(0)(x− q∗)+αq(1)(y − q∗)
=βq(0)(x− q∗) + αq(1)(q∗ − q∗) + βq(0)(q∗ − q∗) + αq(1)(y − q∗)
which is a sum of the best payoff of (x, q∗) and (q∗, y). The proof is similar in other quadrants.
Definition 5.6. g : R2 7→ R2 is a translation map if for any point (x, y), the mapping g((x, y)) is
in RT and if (x, y) and g((x, y)) have the same payoff.
Now we will construct a map f and prove that f is a translation map.
Definition 5.7. Define f as follows. For(x, y) in RT, f((x, y)) := (x, y). For (x, y) in R1,
let f((x, y)) be the intersection point of the contour line and x = q∗. For (x, y) in R0, let
f((x, y)) be the intersection point of the contour line and y = q∗. For (x, y) in RF, f((x, y)) :=
(f((q∗, y))x, f((x, (q∗))y) where f(((q∗, y))x means the x-coordinate of f(((q∗, y)), and f((x, (q∗))y
means the y-coordinate of f((x, (q∗)).
Claim 5.8. f is a translation map.
Proof. It is clear that f((x, y)) is in RT; now we need to prove that it preserves the best expected
payoff. Based on Claim 5.5, we know the slopes of the contours in both R1 and R0 do not depend
on α and β, so f does not depend on α and β. According to the definition of a contour, f preserves
the best expected payoff of points in R1 and R0. For points in RF, since we know the best payoff
of (x, y) can be decomposed as the sum of the best payoff of (q∗, y) and (x, q∗) based on Claim 5.5
and f preserves the best expected payoff of (q∗, y) and (x, q∗)(because they are in R1 or R0), we
can see f also preserves the best expected payoff of points in RF.
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We will show the analysis for q(1|1) ≥ q(0|0). the case when q(1|1) ≤ q(0|0) is analogous.
Recall that in Section 4, we defined T1 as an equilibrium in which agents play truthfully
when they receive bit 1, and randomize when they receive bit 0. This equilibrium is the convex
combination of T and 1 that has qˆ(1|0) = q∗, and is therefore at the boundary of quadrants R1
and R0. We also defined T0, F1 and F0 in a similar fashion.
Having constructed the translation map, we can translate all equilibria to the same quadrant
RT, to ease comparisons among them. If we wish for truth-telling to be focal, we need to tune the
slope of the contours in RT, which will turn out to be a linear programming problem.
Definition 5.9. Notice that in the RT region, the best response payoff is
q(0)`(x, 0) + q(1)`(y, 1) = β(q(0)(x− q∗)) + α(q(1)(y − q∗)),
so the slope of the contours in RT is
−βq(0|1)
αq(1|0) .
We denote this slope by k.
Before we tune the slope k, we will first show, in the next lemma, that truth telling is an extreme
point of the convex hull H of all translated informative equilibria.
Lemma 5.10. Given positively correlated common prior Q, given q(1|0) < q∗ < q(1|1), consider
the convex hull H of a set of points {f(θ)}θ∈ΨQ(q∗)/{0,1} which are derived using the translation
map to translate all informative equilibria to the RT region.
Case 1 (when q(1|0) 6= q(0|1)) In this case, we have three different cases based on the number of
equilibria.
If |ΨQ(q∗)| = 9: f(T) is an extreme point, f(T) and f(T1) share the same facet, and f(T)
and f(F) share the same facet;
If |ΨQ(q∗)| = 8: f(T) is on the line segment whose endpoints are f(T1) and f(F), so f(T)
is not an extreme point of H
If |ΨQ(q∗)| = 7: f(T) is an extreme point, f(T) and f(T1) share the same facet, and f(T)
and f(T0) share the same facet;
Case 2. (when q(1|0) = q(0|1)) f(F) = f(T), and f(T) and f(T1) share the same facet.
We prove Lemma 5.10 below, but first, we discuss its consequences. Given Lemma 5.10, we will
tune the slope k of contours in RT to make truth-telling focal. According to Lemma 5.10, if this
slope k is strictly between the lines which are incident on truth-telling and its adjacent extreme
equilibrium, we can ensure that the truthful equilibrium pays at least well any other informative
equilibrium. When ΨQ(q
∗) = 8, this is not possible since T is not an extreme point in this case;
however, one can avoid this case by picking q∗ 6= q(0|0).
The above results are stated in detail in the below corollary.
Corollary 5.11. Given positively correlated Q, we show how to make truth-telling focal among
the informative equilibria. We state results for the case when q(1|1) ≥ q(0|0); the case when
q(1|1) ≤ q(0|0) is analogous.
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Case 1 q(1|0) 6= q(0|1): Truth-telling can be focal among the informative equilibria and will be so
if β < 0 < α and either of these two restrictions on q∗, k holds:
(1) max{q(0|0), q(1|0)} < q∗ < q(1|1),
f(T1)y − f(T)y
f(T1)x − f(T)x < k <
f(T0)y − f(T)y
f(T0)x − f(T)x
(2) q(1|0) < q∗ < q(0|0),
f(T1)y − f(T)y
f(T1)x − f(T)x < k <
f(F)y − f(T)y
f(F)x − f(T)x
Case 2 q(1|0) = q(0|1): There is no way to make truth-telling focal among the informative equilib-
ria, since f(F) = f(T). However, truth-telling can have (non-strictly) greatest payoff among
them if β < 0 < α, q(0|1) = q(1|0) < q∗ < q(1|1) = q(0|0),
k =
f(T1)y − f(T)y
f(T1)x − f(T)x
Once we have Corollary 5.11, the results of Theorem 5.4 follow:
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Based on Corollary 5.11, given positively correlated prior Q, we can select
q∗ and r = −αβ > 0 to make truth-telling focal if q(1|0) 6= q(0|1).
Proof of Lemma 5.10. Given positively correlated Q and q(1|0) < q∗ < q(1|1), we discuss the
problem under the following possible cases:
{
q∗ ≤ q(0|0)⇒ ΨQ(q∗) = 8 or 9
q∗ > q(0|0)⇒ ΨQ(q∗) = 7
Case 1: when there exist eight or nine equilibria (q∗ ≤ q(0|0))
There are nine equilibria iff the pure strategies are in different quadrants. Since we have
q(1|1) > q(1|0), there are nine equilibria iff q(0|1) ≤ q(1|0) < q∗ < q(0|0) ≤ q(1|1). Table 2
contains the coordinates of all nine equilibria.
The four claims below show that truth-telling is an extreme point of the convex hull of all
translated informative equilibria.
Claim 5.12. When q∗ ≤ q(0|0), the lines that are incident to the following four pairs of points
{0,1}, {T,F}, {T1,F0}, {T0,F1} are all parallel to each other. Moreover the slope of those
parallels is always greater than 0.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from computing the slope of each line, which are all equal to
q(0|1)(1− q∗)
q(1|0)q∗ .
This slope is always greater than 0.
Claim 5.13. When q∗ ≤ q(0|0), going from Q∗ toward (q∗,+∞), the order of the four parallels is
as follows: {T0,F1}, {T1,F0}, {T,F}, {0,1}.
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Figure 4: Best response plot of a prior and given q∗ with nine equilibria. The purple points with
black words are equilibria and the pink points with green words are translated equilibria. Notice
that we can pair up equilibria such that the lines going through each pair of equilibria are parallel.
T is an extreme point of all translated informative equilibria and T1 and f(F) are T’s two adjacent
extreme equilibria.
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Table 2: Coordinates of all equilibria and all translated equilibria when there are nine equilibria
Equilibrium (x, y) f((x, y))
1 (1, 1) (q∗, 1−q
∗q(0)
q(1) )
0 (0, 0) (−q∗ q(1)q(0) , q∗)
T (q(1|0), q(1|1)) (q(1|0), q(1|1))
F (q(0|0), q(0|1)) (q(1|0)− q(1|0)q∗q(0|1) + q∗, q(0|1)(q(0|0)−q
∗)
q(1|0) + q
∗)
T1 (q∗, (q(1|1)−q(1|0))(1−q
∗)
q(0|0) + q
∗) (q∗, (q(1|1)−q(1|0))(1−q
∗)
q(0|0) + q
∗)
F0 (q∗, (q(1|1)−q(1|0))q
∗
q(1|0)−1 + q
∗) (− (q(1|1)−q(1|0))q(1|0)q∗q(0|0)q(0|1) + q∗, q∗)
T0 ( (q(1|0))q
∗
q(1|1) , q
∗) ( (q(1|0))q
∗
q(1|1) , q
∗)
F1 ( (q(1|1)−q(1|0))(1−q
∗)
q(1|1) + q
∗, q∗) (q∗, (q(1|1)−q(1|0))(1−q
∗)q(0|1)
q(1|1)q(1|0) + q
∗)
Q∗ (q∗, q∗) (q∗, q∗)
Proof. To prove the claim, we compute the values of the intersection points of the following four
pairs
{T0,F1}, {T1,F0}, {T,F}, {0,1}
with the y-axis and compare them.
The y-coordinates of the intersection points are given by:
{T0,F1} : (q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q
∗)q(0|1)
q(1|1)q(1|0) + q
∗,
{T1,F0} : (q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q
∗)
q(0|0) + q
∗,
{T,F} : (q(0|1) + q(1|0))(1− q
∗)q∗ − q(1|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q∗ + q
∗,
{0,1} : (1− q
∗)
q(1)
+ q∗
Then we compare them:
{T,F} − {T1,F0} =(q(0|1) + q(1|0))(1− q
∗)q∗ − q(1|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q∗
−(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q
∗)
q(0|0)
=
q(0|0)[(q(0|1) + q(1|0))(1− q∗)q∗ − q(1|0)q(0|1)]− q(1|0)(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q∗)q∗
q(0|0)q(1|0)q∗
=
q(0|1)(1− q∗)q∗ − q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)
q(0|0)q(1|0)q∗
=
q(0|1)(q∗ − q(1|0))(q(0|0)− q∗)
q(0|0)q(1|0)q∗ > 0
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according to the fact that
q(0|1) ≤ q(1|0) < q∗ < q(0|0) ≤ q(1|1).
We see that
{T1,F0} − {T0,F1} =(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q
∗)
q(0|0)
−(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q
∗)q(0|1)
q(1|1)q(1|0)
=(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q∗)q(0|1)( 1
q(0|0) −
q(0|1)
q(1|1)q(1|0)) ≥ 0
according to the fact that
q(1|1)q(1|0)− q(0|0)q(0|1) = (q(1|0)− q(0|1))(q(1|1)− q(1|0)) ≥ 0.
Finally,
{0,1} − {T,F} =(1− q
∗)
q(1)
− (q(0|1) + q(1|0))(1− q
∗)q∗ − q(1|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q∗
=
(q(1|0) + q(0|1))(1− q∗)q∗ − [(q(0|1) + q(1|0))(1− q∗)q∗ − q(1|0)q(0|1)]
q(1|0)q∗
=
q(1|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q∗
=
q(0|1)
q∗
> 0.
Claim 5.14. When q∗ ≤ q(0|0), f(F)x < Tx, f(F)y < Ty if q(1|0) 6= q(0|1) and if q(1|0) = q(0|1),
f(F) = T
Proof. f(F)x ≤ Tx follows immediately from the x-coordinates of T and f(F). Since the slope of
the line incident to T and F is always greater than 0, f(F)y ≤ Ty.
Claim 5.15. If q∗ = q(0|0) and q(1|0) 6= q(0|1), then
f(F)y −Ty
f(F)x −Tx =
T1y −Ty
T1x −Tx
Proof. For Claim 5.15, if q∗ = q(0|0), F = F0, then T, f(F), f(F0) and T1 will lie in one line
since
{T,F} − {T1,F0} = q(0|1)(q
∗ − q(1|0))(q(0|0)− q∗)
q(0|0)q(1|0)q∗ = 0.
Then the payoff T is highest among all informative equilibria iff the slope of the contour line is
q(0|1)(1− q∗)
q(1|0)q∗ ,
which is the slope of the parallels in Claim 5.12, or one of T0 and T1 will be greater than the
payoff of T. But the payoff of T must be equal to the payoff of T0, which means the payoff of T
cannot be strictly greater than any other informative equilibria.
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Given the above claims, T is an extreme point of the convex polygon of all translated informative
equilibria. T1 and f(F) are T’s two adjacent extreme points. We also know that the best response
payoff is a linear function with parameters α, β in region RT, according to Table 1. If we think of the
best response payoff as an objective function in a linear program and of all translated informative
equilibria as feasible points, we can see it is possible to properly choose α, β such that the best
response payoff of T is the global optimum among the best response payoffs of all informative
equilibria, since T is an extreme point. To make the best response payoff of T exceed the best
response payoff of Q∗, we can see that α must be greater than 0.
1. If q(1|0) = q(0|1), the payoff of F will always be the same as the payoff of T since f(F) = T
when q(1|0) = q(0|1). If the slope of the contour line is
Ty −T1y
Tx −T1x ,
then the payoff of T(F) is greater than the payoffs of other informative equilibria since the
contour line incident to T will be further from Q∗ than contours incident to other informative
equilibria.
2. If q(1|0) 6= q(0|1), if we set α, β such that the payoff of T1 is equal to the payoff of F, then
the slope of the contour will be strictly greater than the slope of the line incident to T and
T1 and strictly less than the slope of the line incident to T and f(F). The payoff of T will
be strictly greater than the payoffs of other informative equilibria since T is an extreme point
and the contour line incident to T is not incident to other points, based on Claim 5.13.
This completes Case 1.
Case 2: There exist seven equilibria
There are fewer than eight equilibria iff pure strategies are not in different quadrants. T must
be in RT since q(1|0) < q∗ < q(1|1). 1 and 0 must be in R1 and R0 respectively. So there are less
than eight equilibria iff F is in R0 and not in RF, which happens when q
∗ > q(0|0). In this case,
neither F nor F0 is an equilibrium,
f(F1) = (q∗,
(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(1− q∗)q(0|1)
q(1|1)q(1|0) + q
∗),
and
f(F1)y ≤ T1y.
Now we can see T is an extreme point of all translated informative equilibria and T1 and T0 are
T’s two adjacent extreme equilibria. If we set the payoff of T1 equal to the payoff of T0, then the
slope of the contour will be strictly greater than the slope of the line incident to T and T1 and
strictly less than the slope of the line incident to T and T1. The payoff of T will be strictly greater
than the payoffs of other informative equilibria since T is an extreme point and the contour line
incident to T is not incident to other points, since f(F1)y ≤ T1y.
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Figure 5: Best response plot of a prior and given q∗ with seven equilibria. Notice that T is an
extreme point of all translated informative equilibria and T1 and T0 are T’s two adjacent extreme
equilibria.
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6 Optimizing the Gap
In this section, we continue to focus only on the informative equilibria. We seek to design a payoff
function, derived from a proper scoring rule, that maximizes the advantage (gap) of the payoff of
the truth-telling equilibria over the payoffs of any other informative equilibrium.
Even though we classify all equilibria in Theorem 4.1, it is still challenging to obtain the opti-
mization result in Theorem 3.5. Firstly, we must determine what kind of proper scoring rules make
truth-telling have an advantage over all informative equilibria. Secondly, we must determine, when
truth-telling is better than other informative equilibria, which informative equilibrium is the second
best equilibrium. Thirdly, we must determine which proper scoring rule maximizes the advantage
truth-telling has over the informative equilibrium which have the second largest expected payoff,
over all Peer-prediction mechanisms with payoffs in [0, 1].
Without the help of our best response payoff plots, the above steps are extremely complicated
even in binary setting. However, with the help of our best response payoff plots, the above steps
become approachable. We will show an important observation first: we can tune proper scoring
rules by tuning the break-even point q∗ and the slope of contours. We divide our proof into two
steps:
1. Fix the break-even point q∗ and tune the slope of contours k in region RT to ksup(q∗) such
that the advantage of truth-telling is optimized, over all Peer-prediction mechanisms with
payoffs in [0, 1].
2. With k = ksup(q∗), tune q∗ such that the advantage of truth-telling is optimized globally.
6.1 Attainable Priors
In this section, we introduce the concept of an attainable prior, and use it to divide the space of
possible priors into three regions. For the first two regions, we show that we can obtain mechanisms
with optimal gap and for the third region, we show that there is no mechanism that has optimal
gap but we can obtain mechanisms with gap arbitrarily close to the optimal value, which appears
as Theorem 6.4.
Recall that PF (see Definition 2.5) is the payoff matrix of a line-set (which corresponds to a
proper scoring rule). Now we consider a set of payoff functions where the maximal payoff is 1 and
the minimal payoff is 0.
Definition 6.1. Define U to be the set of payoff functions with payoffs between 0 and 1. That
is, let U = {PF |mini,j=0,1 PF (i, j) = 0,maxi,j=0,1 PF (i, j) = 1}. For positively correlated Q, let
ΨQ(PF ) be the set of equilibria under payoff function PF . Let
∆Q(PF ) = [ν
PF (T)− max
θ∈ΨQ(PF )/{T,0,1}
νPF (θ)]
be the gap between truth-telling’s payoff and the maximal payoff of all other informative equilibria.
For any given symmetric and positively correlated Q, we would like to
1. Solve
∆∗(Q) = sup
PF∈U
∆Q(PF )
2. Either find PF ∗ ∈ U such that ∆Q(PF ∗) = ∆∗(Q) or; if such PF ∗ doesn’t exist, then ∀ > 0,
find PF ∗() such that ∆Q(PF ∗()) > ∆∗(Q)− .
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Figure 6: The regions R1, R2, R3 are good “priors” that we can make truth-telling focal. The priors
in R1 and R2 are attainable while the priors in R3 are unattainable. The white diagonals are “bad”
priors we cannot make truth-telling focal. In the top-right to bottom-left diagonal, q(1|0) = q(1|1),
so the private signal does not have any information. We call this diagonal the set of non-informative
priors. In the top-left to bottom-right diagonal, q(0|0) = q(1|1) (actually we can see q(0|0) = q(1|1)
iff q(0) = q(1) via some calculations). This diagonal is the set of signal symmetric priors. The
yellow region is the set of the negative correlated priors.
Definition 6.2 (Attainable Prior). We call a prior Q attainable if ∃PF ∗ such that ∆Q(PF ∗) =
∆∗(Q); otherwise, we call the prior unattainable.
We divide the positively correlated priors into three regions which correspond to three payoff
functions which (almost) attain the optimal gap ∆∗(Q). These three regions are shown in Figure 6.
Definition 6.3.
R1 ={q(0|0) ≤ q(1|0)}∪
{q(0|0) > q(1|0) ∧ q∗a,o > q(0|0) ∧∆∗a(Q) ≥ ∆∗b(Q)}
R2 ={q(0|0) > q(1|0) ∧ q∗a,o > q(0|0) ∧∆∗a(Q) < ∆∗b(Q)}∪
{q(0|0) > q(1|0) ∧ q∗a,o ≤ q(0|0) ∧ ξ(ksupa (q(0|0)), q(0|0)) ≤ ∆∗b(Q)}
R3 ={q(0|0) > q(1|0) ∧ q∗a,o ≤ q(0|0) ∧ ξ(ksupa (q(0|0)), q(0|0)) > ∆∗b(Q)}
where q∗a,o =
q(1|0)q(1|1)−
√
q(1|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)q(1|1)
q(1|1)−q(0|0) ,
∆∗a(Q) =
q(0|1)(q(0|0)q(1|0)−
√
q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1))(
√
q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1)−q(0|1)q(1|1))
(q(0|1)+q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(1|1)−q(0|0))(
√
q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1)+q(1|1)−q(0|0)−q(1|0)q(1|1)) ,
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∆∗b(Q) =
(q(1|1)−q(0|0))(q(0|0)q(1|0)(q(1|1)−q(0|1))−
√
q(0|0)q(1|0)(q(1|1)−q(1|0))(q(1|1)−q(0|0)))
(q(1|0)+q(0|1))q(1|0)q(1|1)q(0|0) , and
ξ(ksupa (q(0|0)), q(0|0)) = min{ιa(q(0|0)), κa(q(0|0))},
where ιa(q(0|0)) = q(0|1)q(1|0)+q(0|1) q(1|0)(q(1|1)−q(0|0))(q(0|0)−q(1|0))q(0|0)((q(1|1)−q(0|0))q(0|0)−q(1|0)q(1|1)) ,
κa(q(0|0)) = q(0|1)q(1|0)+q(0|1) (q(1|1)−q(0|0))(q(0|0)−q(1|0))q(1|1)(1−q(0|0)) .
Note that R1 and R2 contain attainable priors, while R3 contain unattainable priors.
6.2 Optimization Theorem: Statement and Proof Structure
Theorem 6.4. For any binary, symmetric, positively correlated, and signal asymmetric prior Q,
with q(1|1) > q(0|0) (the q(0|0) < q(1|1) case is analogous),
1 If Q ∈ R1, then ∆Q(M1(Q)) = ∆∗(Q)
2 If Q ∈ R2, then ∆Q(M2(Q)) = ∆∗(Q)
3 If Q ∈ R3, then lim→0+ ∆Q(M3(Q, )) = ∆∗(Q)
where
M1(Q) =
 ζ(Q) 0
0 1
, M2(Q) =
 1 0
0 η(Q)
, M3(Q, ) =
 ζ(Q, ) δ(Q, )
0 1

and
ζ(Q) =
√
q(0|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q(1|1) , η(Q) =
1
q(1|1)(
√
(q(1|1)−q(1|0))(q(1|1)−q(0|0))
q(0|0)q(1|0) − q(0|1)),
ζ(Q, ) = q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)++q(1|0)(q(1|1)−q(1|1)q(0|0)+) , and
δ(Q, ) = q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(0|0)+−1)
2−q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)+2
q(0|0)+(q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(0|0)+−1)−q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)+) .
We note that the actual form of the optimal payoff functions is quite simple, especially in R1
and R2, where they only have one parameter to tune.
Definition 6.5. We define N (·) as a normalization function and
N (PF ) = PF −mini,j PF (i, j)
maxi,j PF (i, j)−mini,j PF (i, j) .
Recall from Definition 6.1 that U is the payoff functions with payments between 0 and 1.
Lemma 6.6.
sup
PF∈U
∆Q(PF ) = sup
PF
∆Q(N (PF ))
Proof. For all PF , N (PF ) ∈ U ; so supPF∈U ∆Q(PF ) ≥ supPF ∆Q(N (PF )). For all PF ∈ U ,
we have ∆Q(N (PF )) = ∆Q(PF ), so supPF∈U ∆Q(PF ) ≤ supPF ∆Q(N (PF )). Then the result
follows.
This allows us to translate a constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained optimiza-
tion problem.
32
Definition 6.7. We define G(·) as a function mapping {α, β, q∗, γ} to a payoff function PF such
that ∀i, j = 0, 1, PF (i, j) = `(i, j) and `(x, 1) = α(x− q∗) + γ and `(x, 0) = β(x− q∗) + γ.
Remark 6.8. If α > β then G(α, β, q∗, γ) is a proper scoring function, and, restricted to this case,
G is surjective onto all PF .
Remark 6.9. Notice that by Definition 5.9, in the RT region, the slope of the contours is
k = −βq(0|1)
αq(1|0) ,
so β can be represented as −kα q(1|0)q(0|1) .
By Lemma 6.6, and Remarks 6.8 and 6.9 it is enough to optimize over the space of q∗, γ, and
α, k > 0.
Proof Overview for Theorem 6.4 We will show three lemmas to prove Theorem 6.4. In the
first lemma (Lemma 6.11), we show that the gap ∆Q(N (PF )) we want to optimize depends only
on the value of q∗ and the slope k of contours in the RT region. Let
ξ(k, q∗) = ∆Q(N (G(α,−kαq(1|0)
q(0|1) , q
∗, γ))).
The goal then is to solve supk,q∗ ξ(k, q
∗); notice that
sup
k,q∗
ξ(k, q∗) = sup
q∗
sup
k
ξ(k, q∗).
Recall that by Theorem 4.1, for a fixed prior, the set of equilibria are determined by q∗. Additionally,
by Definition 5.9, the contours of the best response plot are determined by k. So Lemma 6.11
formally states that the contours of the best response payoff plot encode all the information that
is relevant to optimizing the payoff gap.
In the second lemma (Lemma 6.14), to show how to optimize k when q∗ is fixed, we define
ksup(q∗) so that for any q(1|0) < q∗ < q(1|1),
ξ(ksup(q∗), q∗) = sup
k
ξ(k, q∗).
In the proof there are two main cases.
In the first case, q(0|0) < q∗: This corresponds to the case of 7 equilibrium. Here, by Lemma 5.10
and Corollary 5.11, the points in the best response plot that limit the range of k are T0 and T1.
For the same reason, for any k that makes T focal the equilibrium with payoff closest to that of T
must be either T0 or T1. It will turn out that the gap is maximized by making the payoffs of T0
and T1 equal.
In the second case, q∗ ≤ q(0|0): This corresponds to a setting where there are 8 or 9 equilibrium.
This is similar to the first case except that now F and T1 are the constraining equilibria. It will
turn out that the gap is maximized by making the payoffs of F and T1 equal. (In the first case, F
was not an equilibrium, but in this case it is).
In the third lemma (Lemma 6.15), we will solve
sup
q∗
ξ(ksup(q∗), q∗).
Once we know how to optimize k for any fixed q∗, the third lemma shows how to optimize q∗.
To prove Lemma 6.15, we map out the payment for different q∗ while making sure that
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1. the payoffs of T0 and T1 are equal; or
2. the payoffs of F and T1 are equal.
In Case 1, as q∗ moves from q(1|0) to q(0|0), the gap first increases then decreases. Similarly,
in Case 2 as q∗ moves from q(1|0) to q(1|1), the gap first increases then decreases.
At this point there are two settings. In the first setting, the gap in Case 1 is maximized when
q∗ > q(0|0). In some sense, this is the “good” setting because if q∗ > q(0|0) there are 7 equilibria,
and so Case 1 gives the correct analysis. Here we should take the maximum of Case 1 and Case 2.
In the second setting, the gap in Case 1 is maximized when we have that q∗ < q(0|0). Here we
cannot use the maximum from Case 1 because when q∗ ≤ q(0|0) there are more than 7 equilibria
(in particular, we must worry about the payoff of F). But the analysis of Case 1 assumes that
there are only 7 equilibria (and, in particular, that F is not an equilibrium). In this setting, the
best permissable Case 1 solution does not exist. Recall that to have 7 equilibria and obtain the
gap in Case 1, we need q∗ > q(0|0), but because the gap for different q∗ are first increasing then
decreasing, the gap will increase as we approach the boundary q(0|0) from the right side.
In this setting we should choose between the value of Case 1 at q(0|0) or the maximal value
of Case 2 , whichever is greater. If the maximal value is the maximal value of Case 2, then we
can obtain a mechanism that has this opitmal gap, and this mechanism has 9 equilibria. If the
maximal value is at q∗ = q(0|0), then we cannot obtain a mechanism with optimal gap since we
need q∗ > q(0|0) to have 7 equilibria. But we can obtain a gap that arbitrarily approaches the
maximal value if we set q∗ arbitrarily close to q(0|0).
Finally, when we plug in the optimal q∗ and k, we get the payment schemes as stated in the
theorem. The regions correspond to the different cases/settings above. In R1 we use the Case 1
maximum; in R2, we use the Case 2 maximum, and in R3 we use the Case 1 analysis, as q
∗ limits
to q(0|0) from the right.
This will prove Theorem 6.4.
We now formally state the three lemmas. We will defer their proofs, and instead first show how
they combine to prove Theorem 6.4.
Lemma 6.10. If α, k > 0, N (G(α,−kα q(1|0)q(0|1) , q∗, γ)) only depends on k and on q∗. Thus
NG(k, q∗) , N (G(α, β, q∗, γ))
is well defined.
Corollary 6.11. For any α, k > 0, PF = G(α,−kα q(1|0)q(0|1) , q∗, γ),
∆Q(N (PF )) = νN (PF )(T)− max
θ∈ΨQ(N (PF ))/{T,0,1}
νN (PF )(θ)
only depends on q∗ and on k, which is the slope of the contours in RT. Thus
ξ(k, q∗) , ∆Q(N (PF ))
is well defined.
Remark 6.12. By Lemma 5.10 and Corollary 5.11, we can assume α, k > 0 in the optimal line
set since this is necessary for truth telling to be focal.
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Definition 6.13. Let
ksupa (q
∗) =
f(T1)y − f(T0)y
f(T1)x − f(T0)x ,
ksupb (q
∗) =
f(T1)y − f(Fy)
f(T1)x − f(Fx)
where f is the translation map (see Definition 5.7). Let
ksup(q∗) =

ksupa (q∗) q∗ > q(0|0)
ksupb (q
∗) q∗ ≤ q(0|0)
Lemma 6.14.
ξ(ksup(q∗), q∗) = sup
k>0
ξ(k, q∗)
Lemma 6.15. 1. There exist q∗a,o, q∗b,o such that
ξ(ksupa (q
∗
a,o), q
∗
a,o) = sup
q∗
ξ(ksupa (q
∗), q∗) , ∆∗a(Q)
ξ(ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o) = sup
q∗
ξ(ksupb (q
∗), q∗) , ∆∗b(Q)
and q(1|0) < q∗a,o < q(1|1), q(1|0) < q∗b,o < q(0|0).
2. If q∗a,o > q(0|0) then supq∗ξ(ksup(q∗), q∗) is either attained at either q∗a,o or q∗b,o. If q∗a,o ≤ q(0|0)
then supq∗ξ(k
sup(q∗), q∗) is either attained at either q∗b,o or the right limit of q(0|0).
3.
NG(ksupa (q
∗
a,o), q
∗
a,o) =M1(Q),
NG(ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o) =M2(Q),
and when q∗a,o ≤ q(0|0),  > 0,
NG(ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) + ) =M3(Q, ).
We defer the proofs of these lemmas, and first show how Theorem 6.4 follows from them.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. We will consider three cases:
Case 1 (when q(0|0) ≤ q(1|0)) When q(0|0) ≤ q(1|0), if the mechanism has truth-telling as a
strict Nash equilibrium, it must have seven equilibria. In this situation, ksup(q∗) is always
ksupa (q∗). So supk,q∗ ξ(k, q∗) is attained at (k
sup
a (q∗a,o), q∗a,o). We also know by Lemma 6.15
that NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o) =M1(Q). Additionally, we are in R1 (by the definition of R1).
Case 2 (when q(0|0) > q(1|0) ∧ q∗a,o > q(0|0)) In this case, by Lemmas 6.14 and 6.15 we know
that supk,q∗ ξ(k, q
∗) is attained at (ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o) or (k
sup
b (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o).
1. If ∆∗a(Q) > ∆∗b(Q), then we know that supk,q∗ ξ(k, q
∗) is attained at (ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o).
We also know by Lemma 6.15 that NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o) =M1(Q). Additionally, we are
in R1 (by the definition of R1).
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2. If ∆∗a(Q) ≤ ∆∗b(Q), then we know that supk,q∗ ξ(k, q∗) is attained at (ksupb (q∗b,o), q∗b,o). We
also know by Lemma 6.15 that NG(ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o) = M2(Q). Additionally, we are in
R2 (by the definition of R2).
Case 3 (when q(0|0) > q(1|0) ∧ q∗a,o ≤ q(0|0)) In this case, by Lemmas 6.14 and 6.15 we know
that supk,q∗ ξ(k, q
∗) is attained by limq∗→q(0|0)+(k
sup
a (q∗), q∗) or (ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o).
1. If ξ(ksupa (q(0|0)), q(0|0)) ≤ ∆∗b(Q), then we know that supk,q∗ ξ(k, q∗) is attained at
(ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o). We also know by Lemma 6.15 that NG(k
sup
b (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o) = M2(Q).
Additionally, we are in R2 (by the definition of R2).
2. If ξ(ksupa (q(0|0)), q(0|0)) > ∆∗b(Q), then we know that supk,q∗ ξ(k, q∗) is given by
lim
q∗→q(0|0)+
ξ(ksupa (q
∗), q∗)
We also know by Lemma 6.15 that NG(ksupa (q(0|0)) + , q(0|0) + ) =M3(Q, ). Addi-
tionally, we are in R3 (by the definition of R3).
6.3 Proof for Lemma 6.10 and Corollary 6.11
Proof of Lemma 6.10. Let PF be G(α,−kα q(1|0)q(0|1) , q∗, γ). Then this payoff function only depends
on {`(·, 0), `(·, 1)}. However, we have
PF (x, 0) = −kαq(1|0)
q(0|1)(x− q
∗) + γ (6)
PF (x, 1) = α(x− q∗) + γ
It follows that PF (·,·)−γα only depends on k and q
∗. However,
N (G(α,−kαq(1|0)
q(0|1) , q
∗, γ))(·, ·) = PF (·, ·)−mini,j PF (i, j)
maxi,j PF (i, j)−mini,j PF (i, j)
=
PF (·,·)−γ
α −mini,j PF−γα (i, j)
maxi,j
PF−γ
α (i, j)−mini,j PF−γα (i, j)
The last equality follows from the fact that we merely shifted and scaled all inputs. Since
PF (·,·)−γ
α only depends on k, q
∗, the Lemma follows.
Proof of Corollary 6.11. From Theorem 4.1 we know that the set of equilibria, ΨQ(q
∗), only de-
pends on q∗. From Lemma 6.10, we have that N (PF ) only depends on k and q∗. The Corollary
follows immediately because ∆Q(N (PF )) only depends on the equilibria and the payoffs of N (PF ).
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6.4 Proof for Lemma 6.14
Proof of Lemma 6.14. We show this Lemma in two cases. In each case, we will optimize the gap
between the best equilibrium T and the second best equilibrium; there are two possible second
best equilibria. We will prove that once we set the parameters such that the payoffs of these two
possible second best equilibria are same, the gap is optimized.
(1) If q(0|0) < q∗ < q(1|1):
Based on Lemma 5.10 and Corollary 5.11, there will be seven equilibria, and
max
θ∈ΨQ(PF )/{T,0,1}
νPF (θ) = max{νPF (T1), νPF (T0)}.
So
sup
PF
[νN (PF )(T)− max
θ∈Ψ/{T,0,1}
νN (PF )(θ)]
= sup
PF
[min{νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(T1), νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(T0)}]
Since q∗ is given, let
φq
∗
(k) = νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(T1)
ψq
∗
(k) = νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(T0)
We have
ξ(k, q∗) = min{φq∗(k), ψq∗(k)}
We will show both φq
∗
(k) is increasing and ψq
∗
(k) is decreasing whenever q(0|1)q(0|0) < k <
q(1|1)
q(1|0) .
This is the important range of k’s because T being focal implies that
q(0|1)
q(0|0) =
f(T1)y − f(T)y
f(T1)x − f(T)x < k <
f(T0)y − f(T)y
f(T0)x − f(T)x =
q(1|1)
q(1|0) .
The translation map f is defined in Table 2.
It follows that ξ(k, q∗) obtains its maximum when φq∗(k) = ψq∗(k), which means
φq
∗
(ksupa (q
∗)) = ψq
∗
(ksupa (q
∗))
⇒ νN (PF )(T1) = νN (PF )(T0).
So the payoff contour lines will go through point f(T1) and point f(T0), which implies that the
slope of the contour lines ksupa (q∗) is
⇒ ksupa (q∗) =
f(T1)y − f(T0)y
f(T1)x − f(T0)x .
It is now left to show φq
∗
(k) is increasing and ψq
∗
(k) is decreasing.
To show that φq
∗
(k) is increasing, we show
φq
∗
(k) =
q(1|0)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q(0|1) + q(1|0) min
 q(0|1)q∗q(1|0)(1−
q(0|1)
q(0|0)q(1|0)
k + q(0|1)q(1|0)
),
q(0|1)
q(1|0) −
1
k
q(0|1)2
q(0|0)q(1|0)
 (7)
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From this we can see φq
∗
(k) is increasing since for any two increasing functions f1, f2, min{f1, f2}
is still a increasing function.
φq
∗
(k) = νNG(k,q
∗)(T)− νNG(k,q∗)(T1) (8)
To arrive at Equation 7 we must compute νNG(k,q
∗)(T)− νNG(k,q∗)(T1).
It will help to better understand NG. By Lemma 6.10 we know that there exist functions
αˆ(k, q∗) and γˆ(k, q∗) such that:
NG(k, q∗) =
(
αˆ(k, q∗)(1− q∗) + γˆ(k, q∗) −αˆ(k, q∗)kq(1|0)q(0|1) (1− q∗) + γˆ(k, q∗)
αˆ(k, q∗)(−q∗) + γˆ(k, q∗) −αˆ(k, q∗)kq(1|0)q(0|1) (−q∗) + γˆ(k, q∗)
)
. (9)
So NG(k, q∗)(x, 0) = −αˆ(k, q∗)kq(1|0)q(0|1) (x− q∗) + γˆ(k, q∗) and NG(k, q∗)(x, 1) = αˆ(k, q∗)(x− q∗)
From Table 5.3, we know the best payoff of point (x, y) in the RT quadrant is
q(0)`(x, 0) + q(1)`(y, 1) = q(0)(β(x− q∗) + γ) + q(1)(α(y − q∗) + γ).
The payoff function is NG(k, q∗), so α = αˆ(k, q∗), β = −αˆ(k, q∗)kq(1|0)q(0|1) . To calculate the payoff of
T, we replace x with f(T)x and y with f(T)y since f(T) is the point in RT that represents T.
Similarly, we calculate the payoff of T1. Now we have
φq
∗
(k) = νNG(k,q
∗)(T)− νNG(k,q∗)(T1) (10)
= αˆ(k, q∗)(−q(0)kq(1|0)
q(0|1) (f(T)x − f(T1)x) + q(1)(f(T)y − f(T1)y)).
We would like to compute αˆ(k, q∗) more explicitly. Fix an arbitrary α, γ, and let PF =
G(α,−kα q(1|0)q(0|1) , q∗, γ) Then we know that
αˆ(k, q∗) =
1
maxi,j
PF (i,j)−γ
α −mini,j PF (i,j)−γα
(11)
Claim 6.16. When PF has seven equilibria,
max
i,j=0,1
PF (i, j) = PF (0, 0) = `(0, 0)
Proof. Since
q(0|1)
q(0|0) < k <
q(1|1)
q(1|0) (12)
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we can see
PF (1, 1)− PF (0, 0) = `(1, 1)− `(0, 0)
= α(1− q∗)− β(0− q∗)
= α(1− q∗)− kq(1|0)
q(0|1) q
∗
= α(1− (q(0|1) + kq(1|0))q
∗
q(0|1) )
< α(1−
(q(0|1) + q(0|1)q(0|0)q(1|0))q∗
q(0|1) )
= α(1− q
∗
q(0|0))
< 0
The first inequality follows from the bound on k in (12). So
1
αˆ(k, q∗)
= max
i,j
PF (i, j)− γ
α
−min
i,j
PF (i, j)− γ
α
=
PF (0, 0)− γ
α
−min{PF (0, 1)− γ
α
,
PF (1, 0)− γ
α
} (13)
= −kq(1|0)
q(0|1) (−q
∗)−min{−q∗,−kq(1|0)
q(0|1) (1− q
∗)}
= max{(1 + kq(1|0)
q(0|1) )q
∗,
kq(1|0)
q(0|1) }
The first equality is from Equation (11). The second equality is from Claim 6.16 and the fact
that PF is minimized at either (1, 0) or (0, 1). The third line follows from equation (6).
Finishing up we have that:
φq
∗
(k) = νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(T1)
= αˆ(k, q∗)(−q(0)kq(1|0)
q(0|1) (f(T)x − f(T1)x) + q(1)(f(T)y − f(T1)y)) (14)
=
q(1|0)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q(0|1) + q(1|0) (k −
q(0|1)
q(0|0))/(max{(1 +
kq(1|0)
q(0|1) )q
∗,
kq(1|0)
q(0|1) })
=
q(1|0)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q(0|1) + q(1|0) min{
q(0|1)
q∗q(1|0)(1−
q(0|1)
q(0|0)q(1|0)
k + q(0|1)q(1|0)
),
q(0|1)
q(1|0) −
1
k
q(0|1)2
q(0|0)q(1|0)}
The second line is from (10). After we plug αˆ(k, q∗) value from (13) and translation map value
from Table 2, we obtain the third line. The fourth line is manipulation.
This verifies Equation 7.
Similarly, we replace T1 with T0
ψq
∗
(k) =
q(1|0)(f(T)x − f(T0)x)
q(0|1) + q(1|0) (
q(1|1)
q(1|0) − k)/(max{(1 +
kq(1|0)
q(0|1) )q
∗,
kq(1|0)
q(0|1) })
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We can see ψq
∗
(k) is decreasing since when k is increasing, q(1|1)q(1|0) − k is decreasing and max{(1 +
kq(1|0)
q(0|1) )q
∗, kq(1|0)q(0|1) } is increasing.
(2) If q(1|0) < q∗ < q(0|0):
Based on Lemma 5.10, there will be nine or eight equilibria, and
q(0|1)
q(0|0) =
f(T1)y − f(T)y
f(T1)x − f(T)x < k <
f(F)y − f(T)y
f(F)x − f(T)x =
(q(0|1))(1− q∗)
q(1|0)q∗
if T is focal. In the previous case, the second best equilibrium is T1 or T0 while in this case, the
second best equilibrium is T1 or F. Now we will use the same method in the previous case to prove
that once we set the payoff of T1 equal to the payoff of F, the gap between the best equilibrium T
and the second best equilibrium will be optimized.
The gap we will optimize is the minimum of φq
∗
(k) and ψq
∗
(k), where
φq
∗
(k) = νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(T1)
ψq
∗
(k) = νN (PF )(T)− νN (PF )(F)
To calculate them, we need to give an explicit form of αˆ(k, q∗). Similarly, we have the following
claim:
Claim 6.17. When PF has nine equilibria,
max
i,j=0,1
PF (i, j) = PF (1, 1)
Proof. Since k < (q(0|1))(1−q
∗)
q(1|0)q∗ ,
PF (1, 1)− PF (0, 0) = `(1, 1)− `(0, 0)
= α(1− (q(0|1) + kq(1|0))q
∗
q(0|1) )
> α(1−
(q(0|1) + (q(0|1))(1−q∗)q(1|0)q∗ q(1|0))q∗
q(0|1) )
= 0
To prove φq
∗
(k) is increasing and ψq
∗
(k) is decreasing, we will write them explicitly. We omit
the proof here since the calculations are similar to the previous case, replacing f(T0) with f(F).
Once we have proved φq
∗
(k) is increasing and ψq
∗
(k) is decreasing, the gap min{φq∗(k), ψq∗(k)}
will be optimized when
φq
∗
(ksupb (q
∗)) = ψq
∗
(ksupb (q
∗))
⇒ νN (PF )(T1) = νN (PF )(F)
⇒ ksupb (q∗) =
f(T1)y − f(F)y
f(T1)x − f(F)x
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Figure 7: The x axis is q∗, the y axis is the gap we would like to optimize. This figure is an
illustration of the results in Lemma 6.15.
Figure 8: Here is the case: q(0|0) > q∗a,o and supk,q∗ ξ(k, q∗) = lim→0+ ξ(ksupa (q(0|0)+), q(0|0)+),
since we cannot obtain this supremum, this prior here is unattainable.
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6.5 Proof for Lemma 6.15
Proof of Lemma 6.15. The framework of the proof is as follows:
1. Show that ξ((ksupI (q
∗), q∗) = min{κI(q∗), ιI(q∗)} for some κI(q∗), ιI(q∗) to be defined later.
2. Show that maxq∗ κI(q
∗) = maxq∗ ιI(q∗)
3. Show that for κI(q
∗) from above, there exists a point q∗stat,κ such that for q∗ < q∗stat,κ, κI(q∗)
is increasing, and for q∗ > q∗stat,κ, κI(q∗) is decreasing. Similarly for ιI(q∗) and q∗stat,ι
4. Show that 2) and 3) imply that there exists a q∗0 between (or equal to) q∗stat,κ and q∗stat,ι such
that κI(q
∗
o) = ιI(q
∗
o).
5. Show that ξ(ksupI (q
∗
o), q
∗
o) = maxq∗ ξ(k
sup
I (q
∗), q∗)
6. Show that NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o) = M1(Q);NG(ksupb (q∗b,o), q∗b,o) = M2(Q);NG(ksupa (q(0|0)) +
, q(0|0)+) =M3(Q, ) by calculating the coordinates of q∗I,o and proving thatNG(ksupI (q∗I,o), q∗I,o)(0, 1) =
NG(ksupI (q
∗
I,o), q
∗
I,o)(1, 0), I = a, b.
Part (1) Show that ξ((ksupI (q
∗), q∗) = min{κI(q∗), ιI(q∗)} for some κI(q∗), ιI(q∗) to be defined
later:
We show part (1) in two cases: I = a, I = b
WhenI = a:
Let
κa(q
∗) =
q(0|1)
q(1|0) + q(0|1)
(q(1|1)− q∗)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q(1|1)(1− q∗)
ιa(q
∗) =
q(0|1)
q(1|0) + q(0|1)
q(1|0)(q(1|1)− q∗)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q∗((q(1|1)− q(0|0))q∗ − q(1|0)q(1|1))
Based on Lemma 6.14, ksupa (q∗) =
f(T1)y−f(T0)y
f(T1)x−f(T0)x =
q(1|1)(1−q∗)
q(0|0)q∗
ξ(ksupa (q
∗), q∗) = φq
∗
(ksupa (q
∗))
=
q(1|0)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q(0|1) + q(1|0) (k
sup
a (q
∗)− q(0|1)
q(0|0))/(max{(1 +
ksupa (q∗)q(1|0)
q(0|1) )q
∗,
ksupa (q∗)q(1|0)
q(0|1) })
=
1
q(1|0) + q(0|1) min{
q(1|0)q(0|1)(q(1|1)− q∗)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q∗((q(1|1)− q(0|0))q∗ − q(1|0)q(1|1)) ,
q(0|1)(q(1|1)− q∗)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q(1|1)(1− q∗) }
The first line follows from (14). After we plug ksupa (q∗) in it, we obtain the second line.
Then we show
ξ(ksupa (q
∗), q∗) = min{κa(q∗), ιa(q∗)}
WhenI = b:
Let
κb(q
∗) =
q(0|1)(q(1|1)− q(0|0))
q(1|0) + q(0|1)
(q∗ − q(1|0))(q(0|0)− q∗)
q(0|0)q(1|0)(q∗ − q(0|1))
ιb(q
∗) =
q(0|1)(q(1|1)− q(0|0))
q(1|0) + q(0|1)
(q∗ − q(1|0))(q(0|0)− q∗)
((q(0|0)q(1|0) + q(0|1)(q∗ − 1))(q∗ − 1)
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Based on Lemma 6.14, ksupb (q
∗) = f(T1)y−f(F)yf(T1)x−f(F)x . Like we did when I = a, after all substitutions,
we will get
ξ(ksupb (q
∗), q∗) = min{κb(q∗), ιb(q∗)}
Part (2) Show that maxq∗ κI(q
∗) = maxq∗ ιI(q∗):
We will show Part (2) in two cases:
WhenI = a :
Now we will show
max
q∗
κa(q
∗) = max
q∗
ιa(q
∗)
when q(1|0) < q∗ < q(1|1).
We first show
κa(q(1|0) + q(1|1)− q(1|0)q(1|1)
q∗
) = ιa(q
∗)
Once we show it, it’s clear that maxq∗ κa(q
∗) = maxq∗ ιa(q∗) since q(1|0) + q(1|1) − q(1|0)q(1|1)q∗ is a
bijection between [q(1|0), q(1|1)] and itself.
By arithmetic manipulation, we get:
κa(q(1|0) + q(1|1)− q(1|0)q(1|1)
q∗
) =
q(0|1)
q(1|0) + q(0|1)
( q(1|0)q(1|1)q∗ − q(1|0))(q(1|1)− q(1|0)q(1|1)q∗ )
q(1|1)(q(0|0)− q(1|1) + q(1|0)q(1|1)q∗ )
=
q(0|1)
q(1|0) + q(0|1)
q(1|0)(q(1|1)− q∗)(q∗ − q(1|0))
q∗((q(1|1)− q(0|0))q∗ − q(1|0)q(1|1))
= ιa(q
∗)
WhenI = b :
Similarly, we show
κb(
q(0|0)q(1|0)
1− q∗ ) = ιb(q
∗)
then it is clear that
max
q∗
κb(q
∗) = max
q∗
ιb(q
∗)
when q(1|0) < q∗ ≤ q(0|0) since q(0|0)q(1|0)1−q∗ is a bijection function between [q(1|0), q(0|0)] and itself.
Part (3) Show that for κI(q
∗) from above, there exists a point q∗stat,κ such that for
q∗ < q∗stat,κ, κI(q∗) is increasing, and for q∗ > q∗stat,κ, κI(q∗) is decreasing. Similarly for
ιI(q
∗) and q∗stat,ι:
We will show that κI(q
∗) is first increasing and then decreasing.
For I = a, we will use two facts to prove it:
1. κ′a(q(1|0)) > 0, κ′a(q(1|1)) < 0
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2. The derivative κ′a(q∗) is a rational function where the denominator is positive and the nu-
merator is a degree 2 polynomial.
The first fact implies that the derivative changes sign (+→ − or − → + ) odd times. The second
fact implies that the derivative changes sign at most two times. So they implies that the derivative
changes sign only once at a critical point. We define this critical point as q∗stat,κ. Then the result
follows.
Now it is left to show the two facts. By simple observation, We have κa(q
∗) is positive when
q(1|0) < q∗ ≤ q(1|1) and κa(q(1|0)) = 0, κa(q(1|1)) = 0. Then the first fact follows. By taking
derivatives, the second fact follows.
Since q(1|0) + q(1|1)− q(1|0)q(1|1)q∗ is a increasing function, ιa(q∗) is also first increasing and then
decreasing when q(1|0) ≤ q∗ ≤ q(1|1).
Similarly, when I = b, we can also prove that both κb(q
∗) and ιb(q∗) are first increasing and
then decreasing when q(1|0) ≤ q∗ ≤ q(0|0).
Part (4) Show that 2) and 3) imply that there exists a q∗0 between (or equal to) q∗stat,κ
and q∗stat,ι such that κI(q∗o) = ιI(q∗o):
We begin by proving that there exists a point q∗o between q∗stat,κ and q∗stat,ι such that κI(q∗o) =
ιI(q
∗
o).
If q∗stat,κ = q∗stat,ι, then q∗o = q∗stat,κ = q∗stat,ι and the results follow, so we assume q∗stat,κ 6= q∗stat,ι.
Then we will show
(κI − ιI)(q∗stat,κ) > 0, (κI − ιI)(q∗stat,ι) < 0 (15)
Once we show it, by the intermediate value theorem, we know there exists q∗o between q∗stat,κ and
q∗stat,ι such that κI(q∗o) = ιI(q∗o).
To show (15), we use the result in Part (2): maxq∗ κI(q
∗) = maxq∗ ιI(q∗).
κI(q
∗
stat,κ) = max
q∗
κI(q
∗) = max
q∗
ιI(q
∗) > ιI(q∗stat,κ)
ιI(q
∗
stat,ι) = max
q∗
ιI(q
∗) = max
q∗
κI(q
∗) > κI(q∗stat,ι)
Part (5) Show that ξ(ksupI (q
∗
o), q
∗
o) = maxq∗ ξ(k
sup
I (q
∗), q∗):
Now we prove that κI(q
∗
o) = ιI(q
∗
o) maximizes min{κI(q∗), ιI(q∗)}. Without loss of generality,
we assume q∗stat,κ ≤ q∗stat,ι. We prove it by contradiction:
We assume there exists q∗pi 6= q∗o such that both κI(q∗pi) and ιI(q∗pi) are greater than κI(q∗o) =
ιI(q
∗
o). Then we show the contradiction in two cases:
Case 1: q∗pi > q∗o
We have q∗pi > q∗o ≥ q∗stat,κ. So κI(q∗) is decreasing at [q∗o , q∗pi], which is a contradiction.
Case 2: q∗pi < q∗o
We have q∗pi < q∗o ≤ q∗stat,ι. So ιI(q∗) is increasing at [q∗pi, q∗o ], which is a contradiction.
Part (6) Show that NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o) =M1(Q);NG(ksupb (q∗b,o), q∗b,o) =M2(Q);NG(ksupa (q(0|0))+
, q(0|0) + ) =M3(Q, ) :
We first show NG(ksupI (q
∗
I,o), q
∗
I,o)(0, 1) = NG(k
sup
I (q
∗
I,o), q
∗
I,o)(1, 0), I = a, b to help calculate the
mechanisms:
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Notice that if κI(q
∗
I,o) = ιI(q
∗
I,o) and q
∗
I,o 6= q(1|0), q(1|1), then by simplifying the equation, we
get
(1 +
ksupI (q
∗
I,o)q(1|0)
q(0|1) )q
∗
I,o =
ksupI (q
∗
I,o)q(1|0)
q(0|1)
From (9), we have
⇒NG(ksupI (q∗I,o), q∗I,o)(0, 0)−NG(ksupI (q∗I,o), q∗I,o)(0, 1)
=NG(ksupI (q
∗
I,o), q
∗
I,o)(0, 0)−NG(ksupI (q∗I,o), q∗I,o)(1, 0)
⇒ NG(ksupI (q∗I,o), q∗I,o)(0, 1) = NG(ksupI (q∗I,o), q∗I,o)(1, 0) (16)
So the payoff function NG(ksupI (q
∗
I,o), q
∗
I,o) will be
 1 0
0 ∗
 or
 ∗ 0
0 1
, where ∗ will be
calculated later.
Now we will use this property to obtain M1,M2:
Show NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o) =M1(Q):
Now we will calculate the coordinates of q∗a,o.
We solve the equation κa(q
∗) = ιa(q∗) to get a root between q(1|0) and q(1|1). We know that
κa(q(1|0)) = κa(q(1|1)) = ιa(q(1|0)) = ιa(q(1|1)) = 0. We also have two additional nontrivial roots
root1 =
q(1|0)q(1|1)−√(q(1|0)− 1)q(1|0)(q(1|1)− 1)q(1|1)
q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1
root2 =
q(1|0)q(1|1) +√(q(1|0)− 1)q(1|0)(q(1|1)− 1)q(1|1)
q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1
But root2 is greater than q(1|1) since
root2 − q(1|1) =
√
(q(1|0)− 1)q(1|0)(q(1|1)− 1)q(1|1)− q(1|1)2 + q(1|1)
q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1
=
√
q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1) + q(1|1)q(0|1)
q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1
=
√
q(1|1)q(0|1)(√q(1|0)q(0|0) +√q(1|1)q(0|1))
q(1|1)− q(0|0) > 0.
So q∗a,o = root1.
Let ∆∗a = supq∗ ξ(k
sup
a (q∗), q∗). After substitutions, we have
sup
q∗
ξ(ksupa (q
∗), q∗) =
q(0|1)(q(0|0)q(1|0)−√q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1))(√q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1)− q(0|1)q(1|1))
(q(0|1) + q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(1|1)− q(0|0))(√q(0|0)q(1|0)q(0|1)q(1|1) + q(1|1)− q(0|0)− q(1|0)q(1|1))
When q∗ = q∗a,o, by Claim 6.16, we have NG(k
sup
a (q∗a,o), q∗a,o)(0, 0) is the maximum which is 1.
We also have NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o)(0, 1) = NG(k
sup
a (q∗a,o), q∗a,o)(1, 0) = 0. Since q∗a,o depends on the
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four values of NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o), given the three values and the coordinates of q∗a,o, we can solve
NG(ksupa (q∗a,o), q∗a,o)(1, 1) =
√
q(0|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q(1|1) .
So
NG(ksupa (q
∗
a,o), q
∗
a,o) =
 ζ(Q) 0
0 1

where ζ(Q) =
√
q(0|0)q(0|1)
q(1|0)q(1|1) .
Show NG(ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o) =M2(Q):
We solve the equation κb(q
∗) = ιb(q∗). Besides q∗ = q(0|0), q(1|1), we also have two additional
nontrivial roots
root1 =
−q(1|0)2 −√(q(1|0)− 1)q(1|0)(q(1|0)− q(1|1))(q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1) + q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1
q(1|1)− 1
root2 =
−q(1|0)2 +√(q(1|0)− 1)q(1|0)(q(1|0)− q(1|1))(q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1) + q(1|0) + q(1|1)− 1
q(1|1)− 1 .
Notice that
root2 − q(1|0) = −
√
q(0|0)q(1|0)(q(1|1)− q(0|0))(q(1|1)− q(1|0)) + q(0|0)(q(1|1)− q(0|0))
q(0|1)
< 0,
so q∗b,o = root1. After substitutions, we have
∆∗b =
(q(1|1)− q(0|0))(q(0|0)q(1|0)(q(1|1)− q(0|1))−√q(0|0)q(1|0)(q(1|1)− q(1|0))(q(1|1)− q(0|0)))
(q(1|0) + q(0|1))q(1|0)q(1|1)q(0|0) .
By a similar method to that used to obtain M1, we get
NG(ksupb (q
∗
b,o), q
∗
b,o) =
 1 0
0 η(Q)

where η(Q) = 1q(1|1)(
√
(q(1|1)−q(1|0))(q(1|1)−q(0|0))
q(0|0)q(1|0) − q(0|1))
Show NG(ksupa (q(0|0)) + , q(0|0) + ) =M3(Q, ):
To calculate NG(ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) + ), we first prove that NG(ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) +
)(0, 1) is the minimum 0. Then combining with the fact that NG(ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) + )(0, 0)
is the maximum 1 according to Claim 6.16, we only have two values left to calculate. We solve the
rest of the values by (ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) + ) values and otain
NG(ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) + ) =
 ζ(Q, ) δ(Q, )
0 1

where ζ(Q, ) = q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)++q(1|0)(q(1|1)−q(1|1)q(0|0)+) ,
δ(Q, ) = q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(0|0)+−1)
2−q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)+2
q(0|0)+(q(1|0)q(1|1)(q(0|0)+−1)−q(0|0)q(0|1)q(0|0)+)
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Now we begin to show that NG(ksupa (q(0|0) + ), q(0|0) + )(0, 1) is the minimum 0:
We first show that κa(q
∗) > ιa(q∗) when q∗a,o ≤ q∗. Once we show it, by a similar method to
that used to prove (16), we will get the result. It is now left to show κa(q
∗) > ιa(q∗):
Since there is only one intersection point q∗a,o of κa(q∗) and ιa(q∗), so when q∗a,o ≤ q∗, one of
κa(q
∗) and ιa(q∗) must be less than another. Notice that we have
κa(q(1|0) + q(1|1)− q(1|0)q(1|1)
q∗
) = ιa(q
∗)
and
q(1|0) + q(1|1)− q(1|0)q(1|1)
q∗
− q∗ = 1
q∗
(q(1|1)− q∗)(q∗ − q(1|0)) > 0.
So κa(q
∗) > κa(q(1|0) + q(1|1) − q(1|0)q(1|1)q∗ ) = ιa(q∗) when q∗ is close to q(0|0) since κa(q∗) is
decreasing now. Combining with the fact that when q∗a,o ≤ q∗, one of κa(q∗) and ιa(q∗) must be
less than another, we have κa(q
∗) > ιa(q∗) when q∗a,o ≤ q∗.
7 Punishing all-0 and all-1 equilibria to complete the proof of the
main theorem
Finally, we would like to suitably punish the non-informative equilibria, so that, combining this
with the mechanisms of Theorem 6.4, truth-telling is focal with respect to all equilibria. By the
following claim, if such a penalty only depends on other players’ reports, then it does not affect the
set of equilibria. We therefore punish an agent if all the other agents report the same signal.
Claim 7.1. Adding an arbitrary function of the other players’ reports to the player payments does
not change the set of equilibria.
Proof. Adding a term to agent i’s payoff that is only based on the actions of the other agents does
not alter the set of equilibrium because the marginal gains/losses from unilateral deviation remain
unchanged.
There is a possible issue with this approach: it might be the case that all players receive
the same signal and that the truthful equilibrium will be penalized. Under certain conditions,
this penalty will affect any informative equilibrium with low probability. Thus the punishment’s
expected impact on informative equilibria will be overcome by the advantage of the truth-telling
equilibrium’s payments that we constructed in Theorem 6.4. On the other hand, the 0 and 1
equilibria will fully bear this punishment, and hence have lower payoff than truth-telling.
Theorem 3.5. (Main Theorem (Restated)) Let Q be a binary, symmetric, positively correlated and
signal asymmetric prior, and let Q be the maximum probability that a fixed set of n − 1 agents
receive the same signal (either all 0 or all 1). Then
1. ∆Q(PPM(Q)) = ∆
∗(Q) when the prior Q is attainable; lim sup→0+ ∆Q(PPM(Q, )) =
∆∗(Q) when the prior Q is unattainable.
2. Let t = νPPM(Q)(T) when the prior Q is attainable; let t = lim sup→0+ νPPM(Q,)(T) when
the prior is unattainable. If Q <
∆∗(Q)
1−t+∆∗(Q) , our MPPM(Q) (or MPPM(Q, ) when Q is
unattainable) makes truth-telling focal.
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Note that once truth telling is focal, we can renormalise so that payments are between 0 and 1.
We also note that ∆
∗(Q)
1−t+∆∗(Q) only depends on q(1|1) and q(1|0).
Proof. Part (1) has already been proved in Theorem 6.4.
We start to prove part (2) now:
Recall that we design the mechanism MPPM(Q) (or MPPM(Q, ))identical to PPM(Q) (or
PPM(Q, )) except that we will issue a punishment of p = 1−t2(1−Q) +
∆∗(Q)
2Q
to an agent if all the
other agents play all 0 or all 1.
By our assumption on Q, we know that
1−t
1−Q <
∆∗(Q)
Q
. Because p is the average of these two
values, we have 1−t1−Q < p <
∆∗(Q)
Q
.
By Claim 7.1 the equilibrium of MPPM(Q) (or MPPM(Q, )) are the same as those of
PPM(Q) (or PPM(Q, )).
On the one hand, the expected payment of truth-telling has decreased by at most Qp because in
the truth-telling equilibrium, all agents report their true signals, and for any set of n−1 agents, all
these signals are identical with probability at most Q. However, Qp < ∆
∗(Q). If Q is unattainable
let  =
∆∗(Q)−Q
2 . Then the payment for truth-telling in MPPM(Q) (or MPPM(Q, ) is still
greater than the payment for any other non-informative equilibrium (note that the payments for
all equilibria only decreased).
On the other hand, the payment for the all zero or one equilibrium is now at most 1 − p =
1− (p− Qp)− Qp < 1− (1− t)− Qp = t− Qp. And so truth-telling now pays more than the all
0 or all 1 equilibria.
8 Future Directions
Extending our mechanism to a more general setting (e.g. non-binary setting, asymmetric priors,
and mechanisms where the prior is not known) are interesting and challenging directions for further
work. We briefly discuss the challenges in these directions. In the non-binary setting, the number
of equilibria increases exponentially (this can likely be handled via extensions of the current tech-
niques). However, the space of proper scoring rules also becomes more complicated. We hope that
with the correct generalization of our main technical tool, the best response plots, our results can
extend to this case as well. We are also hopeful that our results may extend to asymmetric priors
(when the positive correlation requirement holds), but this requires additional technical work. We
do not (yet) see inherent barriers to this extension. Certainly, removing the common prior assump-
tion would make the mechanism more realistic. However, we note that if the prior were not known
to the mechanism, then results as strong as ours would not be possible. This is because the agents
can always permute their signals; if the prior were not known by the mechanism, such a strategy
would always pay at least as well as truth-telling.
References
[1] Cre´mer, J. and McLean, R. P. 1985. Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a
discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent. Econometrica 53, 2, 345–361.
[2] Cre´mer, J. and McLean, R. P. 1988. Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant
strategy auctions. Econometrica 56, 6, 1247–1257.
48
[3] Dasgupta, A. and Ghosh, A. 2013. Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous
proficiency. In Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web. Interna-
tional World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 319–330.
[4] d’Aspremont, C. and Ge´rard-Varet, L.-A. 1982. Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs.
Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 1, 83–103.
[5] d’Aspremont, C. and Ge´rard-Varet, L.-A. 1979. Incentives and incomplete information.
Journal of Public Economics 11, 1, 25–45.
[6] Faltings, B., Jurca, R., Pu, P., and Tran, B. D. 2014. Incentives to counter bias in
human computation. In Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing.
[7] Gao, X. A., Mao, A., Chen, Y., and Adams, R. P. 2014. Trick or treat: putting peer predic-
tion to the test. In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation.
ACM, 507–524.
[8] Ghosh, A., Ligett, K., Roth, A., and Schoenebeck, G. 2014. Buying private data without
verification. In Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation.
ACM, 931–948.
[9] Gneiting, T. and Raftery, A. E. 2007. Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and
estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association 102, 477, 359–378.
[10] Goel, S., Reeves, D. M., and Pennock, D. M. 2009. Collective revelation: A mechanism
for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictions. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference
on Electronic commerce (EC 2009).
[11] Jurca, R. and Faltings, B. Incentives for answering hypothetical questions. In Proceedings
of the 1st Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content (SC 2011). ACM.
[12] Jurca, R. and Faltings, B. 2006. Minimum payments that reward honest reputation
feedback. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC 2006).
[13] Jurca, R. and Faltings, B. 2007. Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible feedback pay-
ments. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. ACM, 200–209.
[14] Jurca, R. and Faltings, B. 2008. Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls. In
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (EC 2008).
[15] Jurca, R. and Faltings, B. 2009. Mechanisms for making crowds truthful. J. Artif. Int.
Res. 34, 1.
[16] Kamble, V., Shah, N., Marn, D., Parekh, A., and Ramachandran, K. 2015. Truth
serums for massively crowdsourced evaluation tasks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.07045 .
[17] Lambert, N. and Shoham, Y. 2008. Truthful surveys. Proceedings of the 3rd International
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2008).
[18] Miller, N., Resnick, P., and Zeckhauser, R. 2005. Eliciting informative feedback: The
peer-prediction method. Management Science, 1359–1373.
[19] Prelec, D. 2004. A Bayesian Truth Serum for subjective data. Science 306, 5695, 462–466.
49
[20] Radanovic, G. and Faltings, B. 2015. Incentive schemes for participatory sensing. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 1081–1089.
[21] Riley, B. 2014. Minimum truth serums with optional predictions. In Proceedings of the 4th
Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content (SC14).
[22] Witkowski, J. and Parkes, D. C. 2012. Peer prediction without a common prior. In
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, 964–981.
[23] Witkowski, J. and Parkes, D. C. 2013. Learning the prior in minimal peer prediction. In
Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content at the ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce. Citeseer, 14.
A Additional examples and observations related to scoring rules
Example A.1 (Example of Proper Scoring Rule). The Brier Scoring Rule for predicting a binary
event is defined as follows. Let I be the indicator random variable for the binary event to be
predicted. Let q be the predicted probability of the event occurring. Then:
B(I, q) = 2I · q + 2(1− I) · (1− q)− q2 − (1− q)2.
Note that if the event occurs with probability p, then the expected payoff of reporting a guess q is
(abusing notation slightly):
B(p, q) = 2p · q + 2(1− p) · (1− q)− q2 − (1− q)2 = 1− 2(p− 2p · q + q2)
This is (uniquely) maximized when p = q, and so the Brier scoring rule is a strictly proper scoring
rule. Note also that B(p, q) is a linear function in p. Hence, if p is drawn from a distribution, we
have: Ep[B(p, q)] = B(E[p], q), and so this is also maximized by reporting q = E[p].
A slight generalization of the Brier Scoring Rule is the “Shifted Brier Scoring rule”, which also
takes a parameter c ∈ R. We write Bc(p, q) = B(p−c, q−c), so that both of the inputs are “shifted”
before the scoring rule is evaluated. The Shifted Brier Scoring rule is also a strictly proper scoring
rule.
We will consider two types of transformations on scoring rules: affine transformations of the
outputs and affine transformations of the inputs. The former are of the form PS(·, ·)→ λ·PS(·, ·)+η
of the scoring rule itself; the latter are of the form PS(p, q) → PS(λ · p + η, λ · q + η) of the
input to a scoring rule. For this second type of transformation to be well-defined, we require
that our scoring rules PS(p, q) are defined ∀(p, q) ∈ R2. For example, the Brier scoring rule
B(p, q) = 1− 2(p− 2p · q + q2) can easily be defined on R2, allowing us to consider - for instance -
c-shifts for any c ∈ R.
Recall that any strictly proper scoring rule PS(p, q) is affine in its first parameter p, and so we
can write PS(p, q) = f(q) · p + g(q), for some functions f(·) and g(·). Based on this observation,
the following lemma gives a useful characterization of scoring rules:
Claim A.2. Let PS(p, q) = f(q) · p + g(q) be a strictly proper scoring rule defined on R × R,
and suppose f, g ∈ C2[R]. Then f is an increasing function on R, and g′(p) = −f ′(p) · p ∀p ∈ R.
Additionally, for any increasing function f in C2[R], if g′(p) = −f ′(p) · p ∀p ∈ R, PS(p, q) =
f(q) · p+ g(q) is a proper scoring rule.
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Proof of Claim A.2. Since we want q → PS(p, q) to be maximized in p for all p ∈ R, we need that
∀p ∈ R, ∂PS∂q (p, p) = 0 and ∂
2PS
∂q2
(p, p) < 0.
∂PS
∂q
(p, q) = f ′(q) · p+ g′(q)
so we need g′(p) = −f ′(p) · p ∀p ∈ R. But now, this holds in particular for q and
∂PS
∂q
(p, q) = f ′(q) · p− f ′(q) · q.
It follows that
∂2PS
∂q2
(p, q) = f ′′(q) · p− f ′′(q) · q − f ′(q)
but now
∂2PS
∂q2
(p, p) = −f ′(p) < 0 ∀p ∈ R
Therefore, f must be an increasing function. This proves the first part of the lemma.
Now, the second part of the lemma simply comes from the fact that there exists a function g
such that g′(p) = −f ′(p) · p, as −f ′(p) · p is continuous and therefore integrable.
We use the fact that f is increasing to establish a useful rewriting of proper scoring rules.
Lemma A.3. For any strictly proper scoring rule PS(p, q) = f(q) ·p+g(q) defined on R×R, there
exists a function δ: R× R→ R such that we can rewrite
PS(p, q(1|0)) = f(q(1|0))(p− q∗(1)) + δ(q(1|0), q(1|1))
PS(p, q(1|1)) = f(q(1|1))(p− q∗(1)) + δ(q(1|0), q(1|1))
Proof of Claim A.3. Recall, for any proper scoring rule, there exists q∗(1) such that PS(q∗(1), q(1|0)) =
PS(q∗(1), q(1|1)). Thus,
f(q(1|0)) · q∗(1) + g(q(1|0)) = PS(q∗(1), q(1|0))
= PS(q∗(1), q(1|1))
= f(q(1|1)) · q∗(1) + g(q(1|1)),
and therefore,
q∗(1) =
g(q(1|1))− g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0))− f(q(1|1)) .
Note that f(q(1|0)) 6= f(q(1|1)), as f is strictly increasing.
Now we have
PS(p, q(1|0)) = f(q(1|0)) · p+ g(q(1|0))
= f(q(1|0))(p+ g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0) )
= f(q(1|0))(p− q∗(1) + g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0) +
g(q(1|1))− g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0))− f(q(1|1)))
= f(q(1|0))(p− q∗(1) + f(q(1|0))g(q(1|1))− f(q(1|1))g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0))(f(q(1|0))− f(q(1|1))) )
= f(q(1|0))(p− q∗(1)) + f(q(1|0))g(q(1|1))− f(q(1|1))g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0))− f(q(1|1))
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By symmetry,
PS(p, q(1|1)) = f(q(1|1))(p− q∗(1)) + f(q(1|1))g(q(1|0))− f(q(1|0))g(q(1|1))
f(q(1|1))− f(q(1|0)) .
We may thus take
δ(q(1|0), q(1|1)) = f(q(1|1))g(q(1|0))− f(q(1|0))g(q(1|1))
f(q(1|1))− f(q(1|0))
=
f(q(1|0))g(q(1|1))− f(q(1|1))g(q(1|0))
f(q(1|0))− f(q(1|1)) ,
to complete the proof.
Notation A.4. We now introduce the shorthand
`(x, b) := PS(x, q(1|b)).
For a given strictly proper scoring rule, there exist constants α, β, γ such that we we can rewrite
`(x, 0) = β(x− q∗(1)) + γ
`(x, 1) = α(x− q∗(1)) + γ.
where β = f(q(1|0)) and α = f(q(1|1)), according to lemma A.3.
The following lemma shows that almost any proper scoring rule remains a proper scoring rule
when shifted, and can be shifted to accommodate any desired ratio of the α and β values above.
Lemma A.5. For a strictly proper scoring rule PS(p, q) = f(q) · p + g(q) defined on R × R with
f ∈ C[R], the two following statements are equivalent:
i) ∀r ≥ 0, there exist α, β, λ, η ∈ R with λ 6= 0 such that r = −αβ and P˜S(p, q) = PS(λ·p+η, λ·q+η)
is a strictly proper scoring rule with ˜`(x, 0) = α(x− q∗(1)) + γ and ˜`(x, 1) = β(x− q∗(1)) + γ.
ii) ∃x ∈ R such that f(x) = 0.
Proof of Lemma A.5. Note that if PS is a strictly proper scoring rule, then P˜S is a proper scoring
rule with α = f(λ · q(1|0) + η), β = f(λ · q(1|1) + η). Therefore, i) is equivalent to the following
statement: for any r > 0, there exists λ 6= 0, η such that f(λ · q(1|0) + η)/f(λ · q(1|1) + η) = −r.
This is equivalent to requiring that ∃x, y ∈ R such that x 6= y and f(x)/f(y) = −r: indeed, since
q(1|0) 6= q(1|1), any (x, y) ∈ R × R with x 6= y is injectively mapped to a (λ, η) pair with λ 6= 0.
Now we just need to prove that for f continuous, ∃x, y ∈ R such that x 6= y and f(x)/f(y) = −r,
∀r > 0 iff ∃x such that f(x) = 0.
Suppose f(x) = 0, let y1, y2 be such that y1 < x < y2 and f(y2) = −f(y1) > 0. z → f(z)/f(y2)
is continuous on [y1, x], f(y1)/f(y2) = −1 and f(x)/f(y2) = 0, so any r ∈ [0, 1] can be attained.
Similarly, z → f(y2)/f(z) is continuous on [y1, x[ (f is strictly increasing and so can be 0 at only
one point, x), f(y2)/f(y1) = −1 and f(y2)/f(z) → −∞ when z → x−, meaning any r ∈]1,+∞[
can be attained; this concludes the backwards implication. The forward implication comes from
the fact that if there is no x such that f(x) = 0, then f cannot change sign over R, by continuity.
In particular, ∀(x, y) ∈ R× R, f(x)/f(y) > 0, and f(x)/f(y) = −r with r ≥ 0 is impossible.
Finally, we observe that the output of a proper scoring rule, when subjected to an affine shift,
yields a proper scoring rule.
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Lemma A.6. Let PS(p, q) be a proper scoring rule. Then ∀λ > 0, η, P˜S(p, q) = λ ·PS(p, q) + η is
a proper scoring rule. Furthermore, writing P˜S(p, q) = f˜(q) · p+ g˜(q), we have f˜(q) = λf(q), and
f(q(1|0))
f(q(1|1)) =
f˜(q(1|0)
f˜(q(1|1) .
Proof. As λ > 0, q → PS(p, q) is maximized in q = p iff q → P˜S(p, q) is maximized in q = p; this
proves P˜S is proper. Now, P˜S(p, q) = λf(q) · p+λg(q) + η and f˜ = λf(q), proving the lemma.
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